GOODBURN VS. STEVENS. 443

The evidence shows that the property of the partnership was
worth quite as much at the death of Hayes in 1825, as when
the sales were made, although expensive improvements were
made out of the profits after his death, and the accumulation
of interest, therefore, upon those bonds, would be a clear loss
to the estate of Hayes, if the burden must be borne by his per-
sonal estate. The surviving partner might, and ought, upon
his death, to have sold the property and divided the proceeds
among the parties entitled, according to their respective inter-
ests, and in that event, the estate of Hayes would have had to
pay only the amount due at that time. But, by keeping it, and
carrying on the business, they suffered a- large amount of in-
terest to accrue, which if not paid by .them, must be paid by
the estate of Hayes, without anyJCorresponding advantage in
the appreciation of the property. ,-This, it seems to me, ought
not to be allowed. According to all the authorities, the sur-
viving partners have no right to expose the estate of the de-
ceased partner to the vicissitudes of the business, without the
consent of the persons interested in his estate.

The interest, therefore, upon these bonds to Seal, from the
death of Hayes until the property was soli], must be paid out
of the profits, or out of the defendant's proportion of the pro-
ceeds of the real estate bought of him.

With regard to the bond to Rachel Bryant, (from Samuel
Hayes, which was paid by certain of the defendants, and as-
signed to them,) it is, I think, barred by limitations, and cannot
be set up as against the complainants.

Several sums are allowed the trusteejn statement G. No. 14,
which, I think, are not properly chargeable against the proceeds
of the sales.

His own personal expenses, and the travelling expenses of
other persons, and for clover seed, and other matters connected
with the cultivation of the land, cannot be allowed. Nor can
he be allowed for sums paid R. M. Hayes, nor for postages ;

but I see no objection to an allowance for counsel fees, which
are admitted to be reasonable.

The complainants' 8th exception, (to the deduction from her
claim, of that proportion of the costs incurred in the cause, and