440 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

seem to be quite obvious, that if the defendants were made to
account for profits to the representative of their deceased part-
ner, for the use of this real estate as a part of the partnership
property; and are also compelled to pay the complainant, as
widow, a proportion of those profits as arrears of dower, they
will, to that extent, be paying twice for the use of the same
property. Her deceased husband, who owned nearly one half
of all the real estate employed in the business of the partners,
would receive—or rather she, as his representative, would re-
ceive nearly one moiety of the profits, of which, as there were
no children of the marriage, she, as widow, would be entitled to
one half; and then, upon the ground taken by the complainants,
she would as dowress, receive one-third of the supposed annual
value of the interest of her husband in the same lands. It ap-
pears to me, there can be no equity in this, and it cannot be

allowed.

There are, moreover, circumstances attending this property,
which would seem to take it out of the general rule applicable
to ordinary cases of bills for dower, and rents and profits. The
general rule is well settled, that the courts will decree dower,
and rents and profits, to the widow from the death of her hus-
band. Wells and Wife vs. Beall, 2 Gill and Johns., 468.

But this property, being partnership property, and as such
subject to the partnership engagements; and as upon the death
of the deceased partner it descended to his heirs at law, clothed
with an implied or constructive trust, until the purposes of the
partnership were accomplished; the right of the widow to
dower was postponed until those purposes should be accom-
plished by paying all claims against the partnership, and ad-
justing the accounts. Such was the decision of the Court of
Appeals, when this case was before it in 1847.

The right, therefore, of the widow was not a fixed and ab-
solute right, but one depending upon the contingency, that
there would be a surplus after paying the debts of the partner-
ship; and consequently it cannot, I think, be maintained, that
the principles applicable to cases in which the title of the widow
is clear, and consummate by the death of the husband, will
apply to this case. The property was subject to a trust para-