42 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

junction was not applied for by the defendant at law, but by sn
mortgagee of the defendant, who asked for the protection of the
court, by way of injunction to save property from seizure
and sale under a great number of executions on judgments
against the mortgagor, every one of which, but one, appears to
be posterior in date to the two first of his mortgages, which
embrace all, or a great portion of the mortgagor's property ia
the county, and one for very large sums of money.

The Chancellor is unable to see any thing in the circumstan-
ces of the case, which would induce him to throw this burden
upon the assignee of these judgments, and to engraft another
exception upon the general rule, which makes it the duty of
defendants to pay the poundage fees. But even conceding, for
the sake of the argument, that Mr. Gilmor is liable to the
sheriffs for these fees, upon what principle is it, that an appli-
cation can be made to this court, to compel the payment.

The claim of a sheriff for his poundage fees is a legal, and not
an equitable claim, and if Gilmor has, by taking an assignment
of the judgments, or obtaining an injunction to restrain the
judgment creditors from proceeding upon their executions,
made himself liable to pay the money, what is to prevent the
petitioners from proceeding at law against him ? The case of
Cape Sable Company, 3 Bland, 630, relied upon by the
council for the petitioners, decides, that the claim is a legal
one and that a court of chancery will not interpose, unless
the sheriff, without such interposition, is without remedy. The
right of the sheriff to have recourse to this court, cannot be
maintained upon the ground of lien, because, it is believed, he
has no such lien, for his poundage, as will entitle him to follow
the property when brought into this court for administration,
and such was the opinion of the late Chancellor in the same
case.

But the case of the Cape Sable Company in all those cir-
cumstances, which induced the Chancellor to sustain the appli-
cation of the sheriff, is unlike the case under consideration.
In that case the company, considered to be alone liable for the
fees, was, by the decree of the court, and the sale under the