394 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

As to the statement in the answer, that the consideration
money of the deed had been paid in stock, the Chancellor
said :]

THE CHANCELLOR:

It is the undisputed law in this state, that the receipt in a
deed, acknowledging the payment of the consideration money
may be contradicted; that it is only prima facie proof, and is
exposed to be either contradicted or explained by parol evi-
dence; and in this respect constitutes an exception to the
general rule, which protects written evidence from the influence
of such testimony. Higden vs. Thomas, 1 H. & (?., 139;

Wolfe vs. Hauver, 1 Gill, 85.

But, although the receipt in the deed, acknowledging the
receipt by the vendor of the consideration, may be disproved
by parol, and an action maintained by him, for the purchase
money on the production of such proof, still it is insisted, that
the opposite party, the vendee, is held to the proof of the con-
sideration expressed; and that he will not be allowed to sup-
port the instrument, by setting up a different consideration,
repugnant to that expressed.

In the case of the Union Bank vs. Belts, 1 Harr. Sf Gill,
175, the Court of Appeals decided, that were a deed was im-
peached for fraud, the party to whom the fraud is imputed will
not be permitted to prove any other consideration in support of
the instrument.

The consideration offered to be proved in that case, was
marriage, and the attempt was to set up marriage as the con-
sideration, in lieu of the money consideration expressed; but
this was decided to be inadmissible, the deed being impeached
for fraud. The proof, if admitted, would have changed the
deed from one of bargain and sale, to a covenant, to stand seized
to the use of the grantee. In the case of the Union Bank and
Betts, the disproof of the consideration expressed, had render-
ed the deed fraudulent and void as a bargain and sale, and by
admitting the parol proof offered, this void instrument would
have been re-established as an instrument of a different char-
acter.