380 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

many of them, under the direction of the complainant. The
twelfth cause of the agreement declares, that it was the object
of the company in entering into the agreement, among other
things, to promote leases to other parties, and the entire frame
of the instrument shows that such purpose was kept steadily in
view.

The defendant was to have the privilege to cut timber on the
lands of the company, (not within the limits of the demised
premises,) necessary in the construction and maintenance of the
works, mines and buildings; but this was a mere privilege,
and did not constitute the defendant, in any sense, the tenant
of the lands from which the timber was to be cut.

In the case of Moats vs. Witmer, 3 Gill & Johns., 118, it
was decided, that a party who had a right to enter upon pre-
mises, for a particular purpose, became a trespasser, and an ac-
tion of trespass could be maintained against him, if he entered
for a different purpose. That it was the intention of the de-
fendant which gave character to the act of entry. If made for
a purpose provided for in the agreement, it was of course inno-
cent, if not, he subjected himself to be sued in trespass, and to
the payment of damages commensurate with the injury. So
here—the defendant, under the agreement, might cut down
wood and timber for a particular purpose; but, if he undertook
to do so for another purpose, he is a trespasser, and must an-
swer in damages for the wrongful act. It is the purpose for
which the timber is cut, which gives complexion to the act. If
the purpose be authorized, the act is rightful; if not, he is a
trespasser, and a jury would not fail to make him pay in dam-
ages, in proportion to the injury. A court of equity, it seems
to me, would be passing beyond the boundaries which have
been assigned to it, if it were, in such a case, to interpose its
extraordinary power of arresting acts by injunction, and, if ne-
cessary, enforcing its prohibition, by attachment, fine and im-
prisonment.

Thinking, therefore, that the plaintiff has not made out a case
of irremediable injury, so far as the cutting wood andt imber is
concerned, for making the road, and that the courts of law, if