GEORGES CREEK COMPANY VS. DETMOLD. 371

contract in relation to the six acres, was similar in its terms to
the contract in relation to the two acres. That is, that when
the iron ore should be removed from the land, the land itself
should revert to the vendor. And, indeed, when it is manifest
from the whole case, that the land was only desirable to the
plaintiffs on account of the ore it contained, it is not at all im-
probable, that such was the agreement of the parties. But, at
all events, it is very certain, that the terms of the agreement
which this bill seeks to have enforced, do not appear; and, as
we have seen, the law is settled by the highest authority in this
state, that there must not only be evidence offered fully and sat-
isfactorily demonstrating the terms of the agreement; but, that
those terms, so far as they are incumbent on the plaintiff, must
be performed on his part before he can have a decree, compel-
ling performance on the other side.

The plaintiffs, by their pleadings, have not put themselves
in a condition to offer this proof; and, therefore, if they have
offered any such point, which I do not mean to decide, they
cannot have the benefit of it.

Entertaining these views, I am of opinion, that the bill must
be dismissed, but without prejudice, and shall pass a decree ac-
cordingly. And, under the circumstances of the case, costs
will not be decreed.

[An appeal was taken from this decree, but it has not yet
been decided.]

THE GEORGES CREEK COAL
AND IRON COMPANY

TS.

CHRISTIAN E. DETMOLD.

DECEMBER TERM, 1848.

[INJUNCTION—TRESPASS—WASTE—PRACTICE.]

Courts of equity will interfere, by injunction, even as against trespassers, if

the acts done, or threatened to be done, to the property, would be ruinous

and irremediable.
But, an injunction is not granted to restrain a mere trespass, where the injury