294 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

issue, the portion to which their respective parents would have
been entitled; that is, be gives to each family of children one-
fifth of the money, after deducting the share awarded to the
widow for her life estate; and the remaining three-fifths, he
assigns to the surviving children. This distribution was made
upon the hypothesis, that the whole estate passed by the will,
and, that the children of the deceased children of the testator,
succeeded to the interests of their respective parents, which
was the view taken by the draftsman of the bill.

This view, however, is, in my judgment, erroneous, inas-
much as the inheritance did not pass under the will; but, as
the proportions awarded to the parties by this account, are
precisely the same as they would be, if the inheritance had been
regarded by the Auditor as undisposed of by the will, there is
no reason why another account should be stated. In either
aspect of the case, the result would be the same, and sending
the case back to the Auditor would be accumulating costs for
no object.

The idea was thrown out in the course of the argument, that
under this devise the widow took the entire estate; but, I did
not understand, that it was very seriously pressed, and it ap-
peared to me manifest, that such a construction would be
clearly repugnant to the intention of the testator, and, therefore,
wholly inadmissible. The language of the will is clear and ex-
plicit, that she should hold for life, and "no longer," and
although in a previous part of the clause, the words "in fee-
simple" are employed, it is obvious they were not used in the
sense attributed to them.

An order will pass ratifying the first account of the Auditor.

[No appeal was taken in this case.]