HARNESS VS. CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL CO. 261

follow as of course, unless there are other circumstances exon-
erating them from the duty. The defendants insist that, inas-
much as the complainants have to some extent cultivated these
lands since the condemnation, their responsibility for interest is
removed. It would be unreasonable, certainly, that the com-
plainants should hold and cultivate the lands, and at the same
time make the defendants pay interest upon the sum awarded
them by the jury, as the measure of compensation for their loss.
But in view of the evidence upon this subject, and looking to
the very partial and imperfect enjoyment of the property, by
the complainants since the defendants commenced their opera-
tions upon the land, I cannot bring myself to consider that suf-
ficient answer has been given to the demand of interest. If,
however, the court had any doubt upon this subject, it would
be removed by the conduct of the parties themselves. On the
1st of April, 1840, we have seen, the defendants accepted drafts
for this money with interest from the 8th of October, 1838,
upon which in October, 1842, they confessed judgments. Here
then we have the solemn acknowledgment of the company, that
it was liable to pay interest upon this money, twice repeated.
How can this court, in the face of these acknowledgments of
the company, say they are not liable to pay interest ? The
court must assume, and does assume, that these acceptances
were given in good faith, and when the company had a reason-
able expectation of paying them as they matured, and not that
they were given for the purpose of taking from the complain-
ants the right to resort to the courts for the protection of their
property, if subsequent events should render it necessary, or as
has been suggested, to get rid of the specification, which it is
supposed the complainants may have had upon this land for
the sum awarded them by the jury. The acceptances were
given, as I must presume, with the expectation of paying them,
and because the defendants considered themselves liable to pay
the money, with interest. This was their then understanding
of their obligation, and I can see nothing in the case to relieve
them from the performance of it.

I shall, therefore, sign a decree perpetuating the injunction,