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SHEPHERD VS. SHEPHERD. 247
lished such agreement and acts of part performance, by that
clear and unambiguous evidence which is required by the rule ?
I think not. It appears to me, that the complainant's case falls
below that strict standard of proof, which the most eminent
judges have declared to be indispensable, and a strictness, too,
which no disposition is manifested to relax, the determination
on the contrary being often expressed, not to carry the excep-
tions of cases from the statute, further than required by former
decisions. Story's Bo., sec. 766.
Lord Redcsdale, said, in the case of Lindsay vs. Lynch, 2
Sch. and Lef., 4, that it was absolutely necessary for courts of
equity to make a stand, and not to carry the decisions further,
a resolution which met the approbation of Chancellor Kent in
Parkhurst vs. Van Cortland, already referred to, and which, as
it seems to me, must commend itself to'all who are not dis-
posed to see the statute frittered away, until no vestige of it
shall remain.
In this case we look in vain for that unequivocal evidence
of a contract, to sell and convey, as alleged in the bill. It is
obvious from the evidence on both sides, that Mrs. Shepherd,
the mother, never did consider her power and dominion over
the land, as transferred to the complainant. She spoke fre-
quently of her intention to dispose of it by her will, which, up-
on the supposition that she had contracted to sell and convey,
and had received the consideration money, she of course had
no power to do. It is also clear from other portions of the
proof that the complainant regarded his mother as possessing
the power of disposition over the property; an impression
which he could not have entertained, if he considered himself
in possession under a valid contract of purchase.
That there was a family understanding, that the complain-
ant was to have this land at the death of his mother, is quite
apparent, not only from the evidence of members of the family,
but of others; but I cannot see in the record, that species of
proof upon which alone this court is authorized to decree a spe-
cific execution of a parol agreement in relation to land, and,
therefore, I must dismiss the bill, though there is enough in the
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