DUVALL VS. SPEED. 331

Hodges, upon the ground, that their judgment was a prior lien
upon the real estate mortgaged to said Hodges; which petition
was, after argument, dismissed on the 5th June, 1847, because
"proceedings were still pending to revive the judgment, and
until a fiat was obtained, it must be presumed to have been
executed or satisfied." On the 28th June, 1847, the sales
were finally ratified, no objections having been filed, and on the
30th July, 1847, an order passed, confirming an auditor's re-
port, by which the entire net proceeds, were applied to the
payment in part of the mortgage debt of the complainant,
Hodges.

At the October term, 1847, of Anne Arundel County Court,
a fiat was duly entered upon the scire facias, which had issued
to revive the judgment in-favor of Speed and Pennington, sub-
ject to Sevier's discharge under the insolvent laws, and an
execution of fieri facias, was subsequently sued out upon the
judgment so revived, and duly levied upon the houses and lots
in the city of Annapolis, which had been purchased by the
complainants, Duvall and Saussar.

After this execution had been levied, Duvall and Saussar,
on the 15th of January, 1848, filed, in the case of Hodges vs.
Sevier and others, a petition, praying, that the judgment in
favor of Speed and Pennington, then about to be enforced
against the property purchased by them, might be paid out of
the funds, in the hands of the trustee who made the sales, or
that they might be authorized to pay it, and have the amount
so paid, discounted from the purchase money thereafter to be-
come due from them. To this petition, an answer was filed
by Hodges, the mortgagee, objecting to the relief sought,
upon the ground, that the petitioners purchased without any
warranty of title, and insisting, that if the court could interfere
in behalf of the purchasers, it should do so by rescinding the
sale, and as the property sold very low, giving him an oppor-
tunity to secure a larger portion, or the whole of his debt.
The matter of this petition, was argued by counsel, and on the
6th March, 1848, an order was passed dismissing the petition,
and an opinion filed by Johnson, Chancellor, from which the
following extracts are taken :