216 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

In the case of Price and Nisbet( vs. Bighorn, 7 Horr. and
Johns., 296, a contract by a married woman, to charge land
conveyed to a trustee, for her separate use during the coverture,
with power to sell and convey, and absolutely dispose of the
same, was maintained; and the land charged by her with the
payment of the debt was held liable therefor in equity. The
court, in this case, put their decision upon the ground, that the
charge was within the meaning and spirit of the disposing pow-
er; and expressly waived any decision of the question of the
validity of the contract, upon the broad ground of treating the
wife, in respect of the property settled to her separate use, as a
single woman; resting their decision upon the special charge
by which she made it liable.

The case of Tiernan vs. Poor and wife, 1 G. & J., 216,
was a case in which a wife, having the absolute power by deed
or contract, to dispose of real estate conveyed to her sole use,
after the marriage, without the concurrence of her husband, ex-
ecuted to the complainant with her husband, a mortgage upon
her separate estate, to secure to him a debt due from her hus-
band, upon consideration that the creditor surrendered an ex-
isting security. This was decided to be a contract within the
limits of the wife's disposing power, and was enforced as such.

And in the subsequent case of Brundige vs. Poor et ux.
1 G. & Johns., 1. The Court of Appeals decided that a deed
executed by husband and wife in the form of a mortgage, of
real estate held in trust for the separate use of the wife, though
not acknowledged according to the acts of assembly, created
a specific lien on the trust property, and it was enforced accord-
ingly—the deed being to secure the payment of a debt due from
the husband, and the consideration being, the giving him time
to pay the debt.

In all these cases, it will be seen that there was a clear en-
gagement on the part of the wife, to charge specifically the
property settled to her separate use; and no allusion is made
in either of them, except in the case in 7 -Harr. & Johns., 296,
to the effect of a contract on the part of the wife, without such
specific charge, regarding her simply as a feme sole.