194 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

will and testament, in writing, or by any other writing what-
soever, signed with her hand, in the presence of two or more
creditable witnesses."

There can be no doubt, that these provisions in the deed,
freed the property and its proceeds, from the control of the hus-
band, and from responsibility for his debts, during the coverture,
and that the wife might at any time, during her life, in the way
designated, have appointed the uses to which it should be ap-
plied after her death. She did not, however, exercise this pow-
er, and it follows, therefore, as I think, that upon her death the
property remained precisely in the condition it would have been
in, if no such power of appointment had been created; and the
marital rights of the husband, being only suspended during the
coverture, at once attach upon it.

In the case of Steward vs. Steward, 7 Johns. Ch. Rep.,
245-6, the Chancellor says, "I believe it has been the inva-
riable practice, and that the uniform course of the precedents
will show it, that when it is intended in a marriage settlement,
to exclude the rights of the husband to the personal property
of the wife, in the event of his surviving her, and in default of
her appointment, an express provision to that effect is Inserted
in the deed"—and in the same case, the Chancellor also ob-
served, "when the settlement makes no disposition of the prop-
erty in the event of the wife's death, and provides only for her
dominion over it during coverture, the right of the husband,
as survivor is a fixed and stable right, over which the court has
no control, and of which he cannot be divested,

The deed of settlement which was under examination in that
case, was substantially, in many of its provisions, like the pres-
ent, and the decree was in favor of the right of the husband ;

the wife having died without exercising the power of appoint-
ment.

In the case of Ward et ux. vs. Thompson, 6 Gill & Johns.,
349, the doctrine of the case of Stewart vs. Stewart, was fully
confirmed, though the court made a decision adverse to the
right of the husband, because by the deed he did not make a
mere temporary surrender of his marital rights, but in the lan-