186 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

comes here for relief, upon the footing of that very judgment,
has shown himself entitled to equitable relief. It seems to me
impossible that a doctrine fraught with such consequences,
can be maintained; and, therefore, to avoid inconsistent and
antagonistic decrees in relation to the same matter, I am of
opinion that this case cannot now be decided.

It has been said, that the court cannot, as this case stands,
look at the proceedings in the injunction case; but seeing that
both the bill and the answer refer to them—the former for the
purpose of accounting for the failure of the plaintiff to execute
his judgment at law, and the latter praying that the defendant
may be allowed to refer to them at the trial of this cause—it
seems to me that I cannot shut my eyes to their existence; -and
upon looking at those proceedings, and seeing that a decree
may be passed by the Court of Appeals, upon the appeal, which
might render a decree in favor of the complainant in this case
unavailable, I cannot think it would be proper now to proceed
to a final decree.

[The order of the Chancellor of the 27th of April, 1846, dis-
solving the injunction, having been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals at June term, 1848, and the difficulty suggested in his
foregoing remarks consequently removed, the Chancellor, in
his opinion of the 28th July, 1848, said :]

An effort has been made to impeach the judgment of the com-
plainant; but, I think, without success.

Though the judgment of condemnation of 1825 was by de-
fault, that of fiat executio of 1829 was by confession, and I am
unable to see anything in the circumstances, as shown by the
proceedings in this case, or in the case referred to in it, which
should induce a court of equity to refuse to give effect to it.

The reluctance with which courts of equity interfere with
judgments at law is conspicuous in the adjudged cases, and it
is believed to be well settled by the Maryland decisions, that
chancery never will so interfere, where the parties own default,
or neglect, has made an application to the latter tribunal neces-