184 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

said, and for general relief, and the order of the Chancellor was
in conformity with the prayer.

Under these circumstances the cause, originating upon this
creditor's bill, is brought on for hearing, and the solicitors of the
parties have been heard.

The complainant, Little, founds his right to a decree for the
sale of the real estate of Hyland Price exclusively upon the
judgment of condemnation of 1822, and the fiat executio of
1829. Upon these, and upon the alleged insufficiency of the
personal estate, he insists that he is entitled to a decree for the
sals of the realty. He denies emphatically the right of the de-
fendants to look behind these judgments, by which he main-
tains that Hyland Price, and all who represent him, are con-
cluded.

It is not the purpose of the court, at this time, to intimate
a»y opinion upon the merits of this case, or to express in any
way the conclusions to which the Chancellor may come, upon
full consideration of the circumstances under which those judg-
ments were rendered; because, according to the view which I
sow take, it would be premature at this time to pass a decree
in this cause.

The counsel for the complainant argued that the injunction
granted upon the bill filed by Price in 1830, and which was not
dissolved until 1846, and upon which an appeal is now depend-
ing in the Court of Appeals, did not operate to restrain this
. complainant, Little, from proceeding in equity, and, that the
whole effect of the prohibition was to prevent proceedings at
law upon the judgment. This, however, is not the view which
I take of the subject, and as the bill in this case was not filed
until after the dissolution of the injunction, though Price died in
1842, it may be inferred it was not the view at one time taken
by the complainant himself, as it is difficult to assign a rea-
son for the delay in filing the bill until after the dissolution of
the injunction, unless it was thought that its continuance was
a legal or equitable impediment to such a proceeding.

But, independently of any inference to be drawn from the con-
duct of the complainant, and in the absence of any direct au-