KIDDALL VS. TRIMBLE. 149

deed to another. There certainly seems much difficulty in main-
taining, that even in a court of equity, and independently of the
previous unsuccessful proceeding at law, a party can, after
transferring his right to the principal, recover the accessory.

In the case of JVorton vs. Tucker, 1 Atk., 525, it was decided,
that a bill for an account of the rents and profits was improper
and premature, until the possession of the property was recov-
ered, and that the proceeding in equity was the same as at law,
where trespass would not lie for mesne profits, till possession
was recovered by ejectment. Now, if this is the rule, and a
bill for the rents and profits would be premature, until the dower
itself was recovered, assuming the plaintiff not to have parted
with her title thereto, it is not easily seen how her condition is
improved by the circumstance of her having deprived herself of
the capacity to recover it. If the title to the principal thing
must be successfully asserted, before the incident can be claim-
ed, it is immaterial whether the failure to do the former is the
result of neglect, or of some act by which the party is preclud-
ed from setting up the demand. It is enough that an indis-
pensable preliminary act has not been performed.

In this case it will be found, that the answer of the defendant
does not admit the seisin of the husband at his death, and, per-
haps, if that were a question, it might be necessary to send it to
a court of law for determination. But an action could not now
be maintained in a court of law tor that purpose, because the com-
plainant, by her deed, has unquestionably stripped herself of all
title to dower in the land; and, therefore, it follows, that under
this bill, which does not claim dower, but only rents and pro-
fits, the court must decide upon the right of the complainant to
dower.

There is a manifest propriety in the principle which requires
that the title to the land itself shall be first vindicated, before a
claim for the fruits can be admitted; as otherwise, in a pro-
ceeding which involves nothing more than the claim for the
accessory, the court would find itself engaged in determining
upon the right to the principal. Surely, if the title to principal
and accessory are not decided at the same time, but are pre-
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