146 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

a widow could recover at law damages for the detention of her
dower against the alienee of her husband, though in such a
case, the recovery would not go back to the death of the hus-
band, but only to the demand and refusal. But in the subse-
quent case of Sellman vs. Bowen, 8 G. & J. 50, upon a more
full consideration of the subject, and review of the authorities,
the same court came to the conclusion, that a Court of Equity
alone was competent to give the widow damages for the deten-
tion of her dower, as against the alienee of the husband. It is,
however, unquestionable, that when the husband died seized, a
court of law has full power to compensate the widow in dam-
ages for the detention of her dower. In truth, it was question-
ed at one time, whether courts of equity could entertain general
jurisdiction in cases of dower, to give full relief in those cases
where there appeared to be no obstacle to the legal remedy,
though upon a thorough examination of the subject, the juris-
diction of chancery is fully established, both as to the assign-
ment of dower, and the damages. The jurisdiction is concur-
rent with courts of law, and if the legal title to dower be ad-
mitted, or settled, equity will proceed to the assignment of the
dower, and will also compensate the widow in damages for its
detention. 1 Story Eq. sec., 624; 4 Kent Corn., 71, 72.

The Baltimore County Court, then, having, upon the state-
ment of this bill that the husband died seized, at least a con-
current jurisdiction with this court, it becomes a grave ques-
tion, how far, after having sued in that court to recover dam-
ages for the detention of her dower, the plaintiff, failing there,
can be permitted to come here and ask the same relief. The
record in this case does not show upon what ground the County
Court decided against the plaintiff, the instruction of the court
to the jury being general, "that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover;" and it is argued by the complainant's council in this
case, that this instruction must have been founded upon a
want of jurisdiction in the court of law over the subject of the
suit.

This, however, by no means follows. At all events, in the
absence of the reasons of the court for the instruction against