136 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

by Mr. Yost, who was the attorney of these creditors, for sums
of money stated therein to have been received by him from the
trustees in part payment of these judgments. And these pay-
ments, it is said, have the effect of rendering the provisions of
the deed of trust binding upon the creditors. The defendants,
Mason and his wife, have excepted to the admissibility of these
receipts, and it is by no means clear, that the exception is not
well taken. But, assuming them to be competent evidence,
upon what principle is it that they shall have the effect of de-
priving the creditors of the lien of their judgments ? It does
not appear in the first place, that the money thus receipted for
by Yost, ever reached the hands of his clients, and nearly
five years afterwards, when?ats were rendered on writs ofscire
facias upon these judgments, no credit was asked, or given for
these payments. And, in the next place, if the money was paid
over by Yost to his clients, there is certainly no evidence to show
that; they knew that it arose from the proceeds of sales made by
the trustees under the deed, which was only executed the Oc-
tober preceding the payment. The case of Moale vs. Buchanan
et al., 11 Gill & Johns., 314, is relied upon to show, that a cred-
itor who accepts a payment from trustees, must be considered
a party to the deed under which they act, and of course bound
by it. But that case is totally unlike the present. There, the
party executing the deed made a formal proposition to his cred-
itors in writing, which some of them accepting, the trust was
created, and upon a dividend being made by the trustees, the
creditor in question received an equal share with the rest. And
upon this ground the Court of Appeals said he must be con-
sidered as affirming the deed, and the contract upon which it
was executed. But here the deed to Price and Yost was ex-
ecuted without any proposition whatever being made to the
creditors, or any previous consultation or agreement with them;

and by which all legal priorities were preserved; and the trus-
tees, consequently, in the discharge of their duty, were bound
to extinguish the liens as they accrued. No dividends, therefore,
have been or ought to have been struck among the creditors,
but the claim of each paid according to its date. If, therefore,