116 HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

supposition is irreconcilable with the nature of his feelings and
relations towards them, and to be credited, must be Strongly
supported by evidence.

Much stress has been laid by the complainant's counsel upon
the case of Smith et al. vs. (Gittings et al., decided by the Court
of Appeals at December term, 1845. That case decides, what
is believed to have been well settled before, that marriage is a
valuable consideration, and that a promise made in consideration
of marriage, cannot be revoked at the will of the party who
made it. But the evidence in that case, as it appears to me, of
the promise, was of a far more conclusive character, than in
this. Indeed, in that case, there could be no doubt, looking
to the declarations and acts of Mr. Dugan, both before, and
subsequent to the marriage, that the property in question be-
longed to his daughter Mrs. Smith, and her children, and there
was not a single act or declaration inconsistent with that view
of the case. In this case, as I have already observed, there is
much evidence, leading to a different conclusion, and various
considerations of prudence, calculated to deter the grandfather
from placing this property at the disposal of his grandson.

Now, this being a case in which the complainants call upon
the court to interfere in their favor, by enforcing the specific ex-
ecution of a contract, they must come before it with a much
stronger case, than if they were acting defensively, and merely
resisting such an application made by the adverse party—under
the circumstances of this case, the court must entertain no rea-
sonable doubt of the existence of the 'contract, and be satisfied
that it is one, which looking to what is just and reasonable,
ought to be enforced. 2 Story, Equity, sec. 769; Seymour vs.
Delancey,6 Johns. Ch. Rep .,222.

But there are other grounds upon which, in my opinion, the
relief prayed for in this case must be refused. It is establish-
ed by the cases, and by writers of the highest distinction, that
the specific execution of contracts in equity is not a matter of
absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court,
and that unless the court is satisfied, that the application to it
for this extraordinary assistance, is fair, just and reasonable, in