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606 21 JAC- 1' CAP- 16' LIMITATIONS. possession is permissive, Doe v. dark, 8 B. & C. 719,3 or the party is 452*111 possession as tenant by sufferance, Gwynn v. Jones, lessee supra; for where possession begins rightfully, nothing is to be presumed to make it adverse, and a mere holding after the term is no evidence of adverse possession; it is regarded, said the Court there, as that of a tenant at will, who must shew that he held forcibly, or acquired a title paramount to that under which possession was originally taken, and something more than a mere intimation of hostility to the rights of the other is required. So possession by the assignee of cestui que trust is not adverse from merely not recognizing the rights of the trustee, and a claim under an escheat war- rant and grant is not sufficient, Matthews v. Ward, 10 G. & J. 473. So there is a class of cases where the tenant for life of a trust estate assigns over, and it is held that the possession of the assignee is not adverse to the 8 Permissive possession.—No one claiming or entering under a deed, lease, contract, or license, can repudiate it, or set up rights inconsistent with it, unless there is an open notorious disclaimer of ail holding thereunder and an adverse claim set up which amounts to an ouster, or disseisin. Campbell v- Shipley, 41 Md. 81; Ehrman v. Mayer, 57 Md. 623; Myers v. Silljacks, 58 Md. 319; Hanson v. Johnson, 62 Md. 25; Waltemeyer v. Baughman, 63 Md. 200; Walsh v. Mclntyre, 68 Md. 418; Kelso v. Stigar, 75 Md. 402; Sharp St. Sta. v. Rother, 83 Md. 293; Tome Inst. v. Crothers, 87 Md. 590; Safe Dep. Co. v. Marburg, 110 Md. 413; Jacobs v. Disharoon, 113 Md. 98. Though the reversioner can acquire title by adverse possession against the owner of the term. Kopp v. Herrman, 82 Md. 350; Cook v. Councilman, 109 Md. 637; Herbold v. Montebello Asso., 113 Md. 156. Non-payment of ground rent for twenty year* under the Act of 1884, ch. 502.—The principle that no one claiming under a lease can repudiate it and set up rights inconsistent therewith and that the mere non-demand and Non-payment of rent are insufficient to bar the landlord's title, has been modified by this act, which is supplemental to the 1st and 2nd sections of the Statute of James. It provides as follows: "Whenever there has been no demand or payment for more than twenty consecutive years of any specific rent reserved out of a particular lot or any part of a particular lot under any form of lease, such rent shall be conclusively presumed to have been extinguished and the landlord shall not thereafter set up any claim thereto or to the reversion in the lot out of which it issued, or have the right to institute any suit, action or proceeding whatsoever to recover said rent or said lot; but in case such landlord shall be under any legal disability when such period of twenty years of non-demand or non-payment shall expire, he shall have two years after the removal of such disability within which to assert his rights; provided, however, that coverture shall not be considered a disability within the provisions of this and the next preceding section and that no retroactive effect shall be given to said sec- tions, and the period of limitations herein prescribed shall begin to run only from April 8, 1884." Code 1911, Art. 53, sec. 26. In Safe Dep. Co. v. Marburg, 110 Md. 410, it was held that the act was constitutional and that its effect was to vest an absolute fee simple title in the tenant in any case covered by its terms. See also Lewis v. Kinnaird, 104 Md. 653. |
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