former (the dissolution of the govern-
ment) gives rise to rebellion wherein the
sovereign power, based upon a continu-
ing consent, still remains in the people.
The sovereign power, however, lacks an
executive who will legitimately exercise
the sovereign or legislative power of the
people. The latter (the dissolution of
the compact) returns men to the state
of nature wherein each man is his own
judge of "right" and where liberty tends
to privilege.
Rousseau argued that the social pact
is broken at the moment the prince or
executive usurps the sovereign power of
the people. The state is dissolved and
men are returned to a state of war with
their ruler within a state of nature,
Rousseau pointed out. "There is no
fundamental law of the state," con-
tinued Rousseau, "which cannot be re-
voked, not even the social pact. For
should all the citizens assemble for the
express purpose of breaking this pact by
common accord, it would undoubtedly
be broken by due form of law."21
It is not contradictory to believe, on
the one hand, that government ought
to be overturned at the moment it be-
comes tyrannical and, on the other
hand, that only unanimous consent can
break the compact. Rousseau himself
was unclear in making any distinction
between rebellion and revolution.
Locke's thesis, however, does lend itself
to this distinction and, like that of
Priestley,22 can be said to inspire less
tendency to revolution and anarchy,
while maintaining the right, indeed the
duty, to rebel against despotism.
Locke foresaw the problem of minori-
ties, or even majorities, desiring and
21 social contract,, supra note 12, at 267.
22 J. priestley, essay on the first
principles of government (1768).
8
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conceivably failing to resist the tyranny
of an unjust magistrate or unjust laws.
Both Locke and Rousseau suggest that
the problem is more theoretical than
serious. It will be obvious, stated Locke,
when a train of abuses are adequate
reason to justify rebellion by the people
against their magistrate. Locke, of
course, stated a fatal truism in recogniz-
ing that people are often set in their
ways and, because of the lack of fore-
sight, tend to value stability above free-
dom. Rousseau, appealing to a broad
European public in an attempt to moti-
vate revolution, not just to enlighten
men's minds, claimed that the need for
new laws will be quite evident to all and,
as in Locke, that there is no reason to
fear majoritarian dictatorship.
Regarding this issue of the right or
duty to rebel or revolt, it would be agree-
able to both Locke and Rousseau to
quote from J. G. Fichte: "This contract
of all with all secures to men an
inalienable right to alter the constitu-
tion of the state, and on this rests a
justification of revolution:"23 In the
view of the compact theory, then, this
inalienable right is a natural right, not
a civil right.
This right can be exercised at any
time that one feels a judicature within
a society is not impartial. This right
can be exercised at any time that one
feels that an appeal to heaven is the
only valid appeal for justice. This right
can be exercised by anyone who is will-
ing to declare war on the society by
opposing its means of appeal, who is
unwilling to abide by the will of the
majority because he feels bound in con-
science to reject the majority on an issue
of principle, and who is willing to recog-
23 J. fichte, beitrage zur berichtigung
der urtheile des publicums user die
franzosische revolution (1793).
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