CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY DOCUMENTS [DECLARATION OF RIGHTS] COMPARISON
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Headnotes
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Present
Constitution
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Constitution of
1867
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Constitution of
1864
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Constitution of
1851
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Constitution of
1776
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Amendments to
1776 Constitution
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trust, or employment of any
kind, whatsoever, under the
Constitution or Laws of this
State, or of the United
States, or any of them; or
receive fees, or perquisites of
any kind, for the discharge
of his official duties.
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trust, or employment of any
kind, whatsoever, under the
Constitution or Laws of
this State, or of the United
States, or any of them; or
receive fees, or perquisites
of any kind, for the dis-
charge of his official duties.
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thirds of all the members of
each House concur in such
address. No Judge shall hold
any other office, civil or mili-
tary, or political trust or em-
ployment of any kind what-
soever, under the Constitu-
tion or Laws of this State,
or of the United States, or
any of them, or receive fees
or perquisites of any kind
for the discharge of his offi-
cial duties.
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two-thirds of all the mem-
bers of each House concur in
such address. No Judge shall
hold any other office, civil
or military, or political trust
or employment of any kind
whatsoever, under the Con-
stitution or Laws of this
State, or of the United
States, or any of them, or
receive fees or perquisites of
any kind for the discharge
of his official duties.
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in a court of law, and may
be removed by the governor
upon the address of the gen-
eral assembly, provided that
two thirds of all the mem-
bers of each house concur in
such address. That salaries
liberal but not profuse ought
to be secured to the chancel-
lor and the judges during
the continuance of their
commissions, in such manner
and at such time as the legis-
lature shall hereafter direct
upon consideration of the
circumstances of this State.
No chancellor or judge
ought to hold any other of-
fice civil or military, or re-
ceive fees or perquisites of
any kind.
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Rotation of
executive.
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Art. 34. That a long con-
tinuance in the Executive
Departments of power or
trust is dangerous to liberty;
a rotation therefore, in those
Departments is one of the
best securities of permanent
freedom.
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Art. 34. That a long con-
tinuance in the Executive
Departments of power or
trust is dangerous to liberty;
a rotation therefore, in those
Departments is one of the
best securities of permanent
freedom.
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Art. 34. That a long con-
tinuance in the executive
departments of power or
trust is dangerous to liberty;
a rotation, therefore, in those
departments is one of the
best securities of permanent
freedom.
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Art. 31. That a long con-
tinuance in the executive
departments of power or
trust is dangerous to liberty;
a rotation, therefore, in those
departments is one of the
best securities of permanent
freedom.
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31. That a long continu-
ance in the first executive
departments of power or
trust is dangerous to liberty,
a rotation, therefore in those
departments is one of the
best securities of permanent
freedom.
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Prohibition
against holding
more than one
office; prohibi-
tion against re-
ceipt of gifts.
Exemption of
Notary Public.
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Art. 35. That no person
shall hold, at the same time,
more than, one office of
profit, created by the Consti-
tution or Laws of this State;
nor shall any person in pub-
lic trust receive any present
from any foreign Prince or
State, or from the United
States, or any of them, with-
out the approbation of this
State. The position of No-
tary Public shall not be con-
sidered an office of profit
within the meaning of this
Article.
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Art. 35. That no person
shall hold, at the same time,
more than one office of
profit, created by the Con-
stitution or Laws of this
State; nor shall any person
in public trust receive any
present from any foreign
Prince or State, or from the
United States, or any of
them, without the approba-
tion of this State.
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Art. 35. That no person
ought to hold at the same
time more than one office
of profit, created by the Con-
stitution or Laws of this
State; nor ought any per-
son in public trust to receive
any present from any Foreign
Prince, or State, or from the
United States, or any of
them, without the approba-
tion of this State.
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Art. 32. That no person
ought to hold at the same
time more than one office
of profit, created by the Con-
stitution or Laws of this
State; nor ought any person
in public trust to receive any
present from any Foreign
Prince, or State, or from
the United States, or any of
them, without the approba-
tion of this State.
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32. That no person ought
to hold at the same time
more than one office of pro-
fit, nor ought any person in
public trust to receive any
present from any foreign
prince or state, or from the
United States, or any of
them, without the approba-
tion of this State.
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38. That every governor,
senator, delegate to Congress
or assembly, and member of
the council, before he acts
as such, shall take an oath,
"That he will not receive
directly or indirectly, at any
time, any part of the profits
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616
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617
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