affairs will never admit of this [popular]
consent, but that conquest or usurpa-
tion, force ... is the origin of almost
all new [governments]."10 Hume wrote
of what he saw and had experienced.
Contemporary world conditions, he
claimed, forced him to conclude that
magistrates are necessary in society and
that from this need is derived all
allegiance and moral obligation.
Hume's predictions were projected no
further than those which could be based
upon man's knowledge as compiled
through the cumulative processes.
A refutation to this line of thinking
is contained in the words of John Locke:
"Government is everywhere antecedent
to records." He implied that one should
not become so impatient in awaiting
examples to prove a theory that valid
parts are rejected along with the false;
and further, that examples to sustain a
theory's validity may come after the
theory itself and that attempts to foresee
or influence the future may bring results
which will subsequently serve to sub-
stantiate the theory. In writing his
Second Treatise it was Locke's objective
to justify the English Revolution of
1689; beyond this Locke sought to
explain the origins and ends of civil
government in contract theory, which
by and large were contradicted by the
governments actually existing in Hume's
day. If this is to be sufficient cause to
discredit Locke in toto, one must banish
forever from the annals of world history
the American and French Revolutions,
both of which originated at least in part
from concepts substantiated by the
compact theory.
Numerous nineteenth century attacks
upon the compact theory were made on
10 D. Hume, Of the Original Contract, in
social contract.
4
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psychological grounds. The social com-
pact could not explain the origin of
political obligation, asserted S. T. Cole-
ridge, because, unless our ancestors were
already under its impulsion, they would
not have been capable of making any
original contract. Similarly, Bluntschli
pointed out, while emphasizing the
truth that the form of the state can be
influenced and determined by human
will, that contractarianism is illogical
because it assumes as prior to the state
what is only conceivable as its product.11
Those who oppose contractarianism for
psychological reasons reject the tradi-
tional arguments which have been made
to explain the associations of men with
one another in a state of nature before
the creation of a society is legalized by
contract. Hume, as has been observed,
believed that popular acquiescence led
to habitual obedience. As for the nature
of the "original contract," he denied
that such a term was of value: "The
conditions upon which they were willing
to submit were either expressed or were
so clear and obvious, that it might well
be esteemed superfluous to express
them."12 What Hume did imply was
that the conditions among men which
lead to mutual association occur in
nature before any compact can be for-
malized.
Montesquieu suggested that man's
natural fear of his own kind stimulates
association for mutual protection. This
association of men leads to pleasure
which results in a natural inclination
to be with one's own kind despite the
paradoxical scepticism man holds for his
fellow man. Not unlike the Greeks,
11 4 J. bluntschli, theory of the
state, ch. 9 (1852).
12 social contract, 149 (Oxford U.
Press, 1962).
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