was to prevent the District of
Columbia from engaging legal
church regulations, and from exer-
cising corporate rights in their con-
gregations? Does the Legislature of
Maryland believe it is creating a
religious establishment when it is
occupied in granting charters to the
churches of the different sects of
Christians as often as they apply?
Where all are equally protected
and accommodated, where each
sect . . . has its own establishment,
. . . the best security exists against,
'a religious establishment,' that is to
say, one preeminent establishment
which is preferred and set up over
the rest against which alone the
constitutional safeguard was cre-
ated."157
Recent courts seem to have taken sim-
ilar views. Said Justice Douglas, in an
often quoted passage from Zorach v.
Clauson (1952):
"We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom
to worship as one chooses. . . . We
sponsor an attitude on the part of
government that shows no par-
tiality to any one group and lets
each flourish according to the zeal
of its adherents and the appeal of
its dogma. When the state encour-
ages religious instructions or co-
operates with religious authorities
by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows
the best of our traditions. For it
then respects the religious nature
of our people and accommodates
the public service of our spiritual
157 Baltimore Federal Republican & Com-
mercial Gazette, February 26, 1811 (edi-
torial).
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needs. To hold that it may not
would be to find in the Constitution
a requirement that the government
show a callous indifference to re-
ligious groups. That would be
preferring those who believe in
no religion over those who do
believe." 158
A 1956 Tennessee case pointed out
that the doctrine of separation of church
and state "should not be tortured into a
meaning that was never intended by the
Founders of this Republic."159 The
highest court of Maryland recently took
an expressly favorable view of Bible
reading in the public schools, claiming
that "neither the 1st nor the 14th
amendment was intended to stifle all
rapport between religion and govern-
ment."160 The Maryland Court was
reversed by the Supreme Court,161 but
Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the
majority, was careful to warn against a
"religion of secularism."162 The State
158 343 U.S. 306, 313, 72 S.Ct. 679, 684
(1952). See note 134 supra.
159 Garden v. Bland, 288 S.W. 2d 718, 724
(1956).
160 Murray v. Curlett, 179 A. 2d 698, 701
(1962) (rev'd, 374 U.S. 203). See D. boles,
the bible, religion, and the public
schools 99ff. (1965). Even the dissenters
in the Murray case did so because they felt
that the required saying of the Lord's Prayer
and Bible-reading plainly favored "one reli-
gion and to do so against other religions and
against nonbelievers in any religion." 179
A.2d 698 at 708. They still do not deny that
the First Amendment could involve nondis-
criminatory laws without being a violation of
the freedom of religion ; they still do not in-
sist upon strict separation of church and state.
See also Horace Mann League v. Tawes
(Cir. Ct. for Anne Arundel County, March 1 1,
1965), in Daily Record, April 8, 1965, at
2, col. 1, appellate court decision cited supra
note 98.
161374 U.S. 203 (1963), supra note 138.
162 See supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
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