purpose of effecting a transition from
the old government to the new, and
of putting the provisions of the new
constitution into effect,10 but the
provisions thereof, adopted as a part
of the constitution, may be equally
binding with it.11 A constitutional
convention, in the adoption of ordi-
nances, is subject to the limitations
on the power of the states contained
in the federal constitution and amend-
10 Del. — Wilmington Trust Co. v. Baldwin,
38 Del. 595, 195 A. 287 (1937).
Mo. — First Nat. Bank v. Buchanan County,
356 Mo. 205 S. W. 2d 726, 1204 (1947)—
corpus juris quoted in State ex. rel. Aquamsi
Land Co. v. Hostetter, 336 Mo. 391, 79 S.W.
2d 463, 467 (1934).
Okl. — corpus juris quoted in Mann v. Os-
borne, 128 Okl. 32 261 P. 146, 148, (1927).
Pa. — Commonwealth v. Clark, 7 W. & S.
127 (1844). Commonwealth v. Harrison, 51
Pa. D. & C. 139, 54 Dauph. Co. 395 (1943).
12 C.J. Constitutional Law § 34 n. 35 (1917).
Schedule presumed temporary.
A provision found among the temporary
provisions in a schedule is generally presumed
to be temporary.
Mo. — State ex. rel. Aquamsi Land Co. v.
Hostetter, 336 Mo. 391, 79 S.W. 2d 463
(1934).
11 Del. — Wilmington Trust Co. v. Baldwin,
38 Del. 595, 195 A. 287 (1937).
Mo. — State ex. rel. Aquamsi Land Co. v.
Hostetter, 336 Mo. 391, 79 S.W. 2d 463
(1934). Permanent effect.
In order to hold that a provision of the
schedule has a permanent effect, to the ex-
tent of setting aside a section of the con-
stitution, there must be not only the language
which compels such a decision, but a situa-
tion which requires it.
Pa. — Commonwealth v. Harrison, 51 Pa. D. &
C. 139, 145, 51 Dauph. Co. 395 (1943).
Numbering of new section or article.
The specific requirement of schedule of
constitution relating to numbering of new sec-
tion or article pertains solely to legislative acts
and not to amendments to the constitution.
Mo.— Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526, 121
S.W. 2d 737 (1938).
366
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ments,12 and also, it has been held,
to provisions contained in the bill of
rights of both the old and the new
constitution.13 In those states in
which the constitutions themselves
must be ratified by the people, the
validity of such ordinances depends
on their submission to the people and
their ratification in due form;14 con-
versely, in those states in which new
constitutions need not be submitted
to the people, valid ordinances may
be adopted and proclaimed by con-
stitutional conventions without such
submission.15
"Generally, a constitutional con-
vention's authority to pass ordinances
and give them validity depends on
powers conferred on the convention
by the law which authorizes their
assemblage, and where such law does
not provide that the convention shall
have the power of independent legis-
lation, the validity of convention ordi-
nances depends on their submission
and ratification by the people.16 To
the extent that an ordinance has been
legally adopted, it is a part of the
supreme law of the state, and, within
the scope of its meaning, it is beyond
the control of the legislature,17 but it
12 N.C.— State v. Keith, 63 N.C. 140
(1869). 12 C. J. Constitutional Law § 34 n.
36 (1917).
13 N.C.— State v. Keith, 63 N.C. 140
(1869).
14 Ala. — Ex pane Birmingham & A. Ry.,
145 Ala. 514, 42 So. 118 (1905).
12 C.J. Constitutional Law § 34 n. 38 (1917).
15 Va.— Willis v. Kalmbach, 109 Va. 475,
64 S.E. 342, 21 L.R.A., n.s., 1009 (1909).
12 C.J. Constitutional Law § 34 n. 39 (1917).
16Tex.— Bass v. Albright, Civ. App., 59
S. W. 2d 801 (1933) (error refused).
17 Okl. — corpus juris secundum cited
in Cox v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 197 Okla. 12
168 P. 2d 634, 645.
Tex.— Bass v. Albright, Civ. App., 59 S.W. 2d
891 (1933) (error refused).
12 C.J. Constitutional Law § 34 n. 40 (1917).
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