vention has delegated, and no inherent,
rights; that the authority delegated to
the convention was the power to revise
and amend the former Constitution, and
did not include the authority to pass
local legislation, and that such legisla-
tion, being unauthorized, could not be-
come binding unless ratified by the
people. While it is doubtful whether
the case squarely supports the view that
in the situation under discussion a legis-
lature has power to limit the powers of
a constitutional convention even with
respect to matters concerning the
amendment and revision of the Consti-
tution, the language used in the opinion
and the general theory upon which it is
based seem to support such a view.
Thus, in rejecting the contention that
if the adoption of the ordinance was
beyond the authority of the convention,
it was nevertheless valid and binding
because the Constitution was submitted
to and ratified by the people, the court
pointed out that the ordinance never
was ratified and said: "The act formu-
lating a call of the convention, and
which was voted on by the people, pro-
vided only for 'amending and revising'
the Constitution, and § 22 also required
that the instrument framed should be
submitted to the people for ratification
or rejection. The people, therefore, in
voting for the holding of a convention,
not only limited the powers of the con-
vention to the amendment and revision
of the Constitution of 1875, but required
that its action be submitted back to
them. The convention, realizing the re-
quirements placed thereon by the powers
calling it into existence, provided by
paragraph 4 of § 287 that the Constitu-
tion be submitted to the electors of the
state for ratification or rejection, but no
provision was made for a submission of
the ordinance in question." And upon
rehearing the court said: "The act so
|
clearly defined the purpose for which
the convention should be held that we
have every reason to conclude that the
legislature did not, for a moment, antic-
ipate that the convention would under-
take to indulge in local legislation."
In Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 15 Am.
Rep. 563 (1873), under a constitution
which contained no provision for a re-
vision thereof by way of a constitutional
convention, but only by way of adoption
of amendments by the legislature and
ratification by the people, the Pennsyl-
vania Legislature passed an act of June
2, 1871, authorizing a popular vote upon
the question of calling a convention to
amend the existing constitution. After
this question was answered in the affirm-
ative by a majority of votes, the legisla-
ture passed an act of April 11, 1872, to
provide for calling a convention to
amend the Constitution, this act making
provisions for the election of delegates,
their assembling, their powers and
duties, and the submission of the Con-
stitution or amendments agreed upon to
a vote of the people for adoption or
rejection. In particular, with respect to
the last point, it was provided that "the
election to decide for or -against the
adoption of the new Constitution or
specific amendments shall', be conducted
as the general elections of this common-
wealth are now by law conducted." It
was also provided that one-third of the
members should have the right to re-
quire the separate and distinct submis-
sion to the popular vote of any amend-
ment. Under this latter act the people
voted for delegates to the convention.
In disregard of the mandate in the Act
of 1872, the constitutional convention,
in an ordinance for submitting the
amended Constitution to a vote of the
electors, provided election machinery,
and appointed election commissioners,
349
|
