of a constitutional convention,9 the
question whether a state legislature has
the power to limit the powers of a state
constitutional convention is not suscep-
tible of an unconditional answer, since
it depends upon a number of factors.
One of these factors is whether or not
the existing constitution expressly au-
thorizes the legislature to enact a law
calling a constitutional convention. Cf.
Carton v. Secretary of State, 151 Mich.
337, 115 N.W. 429 (1908), infra, IV,
where in denying the power of the legis-
lature to limit the power of a constitu-
tional convention, the case of Wells v.
Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 15 Am. Rep. 563 (1873),
infra, III, in which the opposite result
had been reached, was distinguished
on the ground that the Constitution of
Pennsylvania there involved contained
no provision for the general revision
thereof, while in the Michigan Consti-
tution ample provision was made for
such revision. Similarly, in the dissent-
ing opinion in Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va.
613, 33 S.E. (2d) 49 (1945), (Va.)
the attempt was made to distinguish Re
Opinion to Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178 A.
433 (1935), infra, on the ground that,
as contrasted with the Virginia Consti-
tution, the Rhode Island Constitution
contains no mention of a constitutional
change by calling a constitutional con-
vention.
Another, and it is believed the most
important, factor is whether the law
which purports to limit the powers of a
9 For a case dealing with a constitutional
provision expressly conferring upon a consti-
tutional convention the "power to appoint
such officers, employees, and assistants as it
may deem necessary, and fix their compensa-
tion, and to provide for the printing of its
documents, journals, proceedings, and a rec-
ord of its debates, and to appropriate money
to pay for the expenditures incurred," see
State ex rel. News Corp. v. Smith, 353 Mo.
845, 184 S.W. 2d 598 (1945).
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constitutional convention called thereby
has or has not been approved directly
by the people at an election held there-
under, or at least indirectly by being
enacted before the people voted for the
calling of, or elected delegates to, the
constitutional convention.
This distinction seems to be the basis
of Re Opinion to Governor, 55 R.I. 56,
178 A. 433 (1935). There, under a
constitution which contained no provi-
sion for revision or change by way of
calling a constitutional convention, but
only by vote of a majority of all the
members elected to each house and ap-
proval of their proposals by popular
vote, the governor of the State of Rhode
Island requested the opinion of the
judges of the state supreme court upon
a number of questions relating to the
validity of a law for calling a constitu-
tional convention, among them, whether
it would be a valid exercise of the legis-
lative power if the general assembly
should provide therein ( 1 ) for the or-
ganization and conduct of such conven-
tion, (2) for the submission to the
people, for their ratification and adop-
tion, of any constitution or amendments
proposed by such convention, and (3)
for declaring the result and effect of the
vote of a majority of the electors voting
upon the question of such -ratification
and adoption. After reaching the con-
clusion that for the reasons expressed in
the opinion a constitutional convention
can be called by the general assembly to
revise the existing constitution, and that
its delegates must be chosen by the peo-
ple and cannot be imposed upon the
convention by any other authority, the
judges answered question (1) in the
affirmative if the question is submitted
to the people and the act of the general
assembly prescribing rules for organiza-
tion and conduct of the convention is
brought to their notice before voting on
343
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