"The same cases also approve the
doctrine that where the constitution
creates an office, fixes its term and
provides upon what conditions the
incumbent may be removed before
the expiration of his term, it is beyond
the power of the legislature or any
other authority to remove or suspend
such officer in any manner than that
provided by the constitution. Balloon
v. Clark, 61 Kan. 121, 58 P. 990;
Lowe v. Com., 3 Mete., Ky., 237;
Throop, Pub. Off., Section 341 ; State
ex rel. Holmes' v. Wiltz, 1 1 La. Ann.
439; State ex rel. Robinson v. Mc-
Neely, 24 La. Ann. 19; Brown v.
Grover, 6 Bush, Ky. 1; Page v. Har-
din, 8 B.Mon., Ky., 648; Mechem,
Pub. Off., Section 457."7
While this case did not involve an im-
peachment proceeding, the rule would
appear to be applicable if such had
been attempted without constitutional
authority, since "it is beyond the power
of the legislature to remove or suspend
... in any manner than that provided
by the constitution."
Under English common law, Parlia-
ment had extremely broad impeach-
ment powers. However, it is difficult to
draw an analogy between the common
law powers of Parliament and the pow-
ers of state legislatures. In England,
the Parliament is recognized as right-
fully exercising the full sovereign au-
thority of the country.8 But as one
author points out, United States legis-
latures are not so fully endowed:
"The American legislatures only
exercise a certain portion of the sov-
ereign power. The sovereignty is in
the people; and the legislatures which
7 In re Investigation of Circuit Judge, 93
So. 2d 601 (Fla., 1957).
8 T. cooley, treatise on the constitu-
tional limitations which rest upon the
legisative power of the states 175 (8th
ed. 1927).
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they have created are only to dis-
charge a trust of which they have been
made a depositary, but which has
been placed in their hands with well-
defined restrictions."9
Another reason why it is difficult to
draw any analogy between the broad
impeachment powers of Parliament and
the impeachment powers of United
States legislatures, is that the latter are
subject to the principle of separation of
powers. Since legislatures are given
only legislative power, and since, as
numerous authorities have held, im-
peachment proceedings are judicial,
without an express grant of power in
the constitution a legislature could not
impeach a state officer without violating
the separation of powers doctrine. This
problem is usually avoided by a formal
grant of impeachment power to the
legislature. An authority on common
law history states: "In America im-
peachment still exists, where it is a for-
mal exception to the principle of the
separation of powers, inherited from
English practice, and preserved in the
federal and state constitutions."10
While it would thus appear that state
legislatures do not have impeachment
powers unless such are constitutionally
conferred and vested, nevertheless, the
grounds for impeachment and the pro-
cedure to be followed, apparently need
not be spelled out in the constitution.
As stated in Ferguson v. Maddox, "The
grant of the general power of 'impeach-
ment' properly and sufficiently indicates
the causes for its exercise."11 The same
rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secun-
dum: "While some constitutional pro-
visions expressly designate certain of-
9 Ibid.
10 T. plucknett, A concise history of
the common law 204 (1956).
"Ferguson v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 888
(Tex., 1924).
335
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