ment for non-elective or non-appointive
offices (e.g., employees such as school
teachers) found in Section 13 of the Ober
Law. Application of Article 37 is to all
other offices, whether created by the Con-
stitution or by act of the legislature.7
Thus, Article XV, Section 1 1 of the Con-
stitution is not needed to sustain the
validity of Section 13 of the Ober Law
when it applies to employees (as distinct
from officers) .
Section 15 of the Ober Law, however,
concerns only elected officials. Those who
are appointed, if they are to be included
(as we might assume they are) within
the scope of the anti-subversive act,
would necessarily come under the pur-
view of Section 13 (as do employees).
Since they are holders of offices of trust
or profit, even though not elected, they
would also be covered by Article 37 of
the Declaration of Rights. Therefore both
elective and appointive officers must be
treated as the same when determining
if the Ober Law can stand without Ar-
ticle XV, Section 11.
In Shub v. Simpson,8 Section 15 of
the Ober Law was attacked primarily on
the ground that it required an oath of
office additional to the one provided by
the Maryland Constitution and was,
therefore, invalid under the Article 37
prohibition. The Court of Appeals did
not share that view. It held that Section
15 of the Ober Law required not an oath
but merely an affidavit of qualification9
7Davidson v. Brice, 91 Md. 681, 690
(1900).
8 196 Md. 177, 76 A.2d 332 (1950), appeal
dismissed, 340 U.S. 881 (1951).
9 An "affidavit," as denned in black's law
dictionary, is "a written or printed declara-
tion or statement of facts, made voluntarily,
and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of
the party making it, taken before an officer
having authority to administer such an oath.
Cox v. Stern, 170 111. 442, 48 N.E. 906, 62 Am.
326
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for office which would implement Article
XV, Section 11 of the Constitution.10
Appellants in Shub., however, further
contended that the affidavit required
under Section 15 of the Act (for candi-
dates) went far beyond the scope of Arti-
cle XV, Section 11 of the Constitution;
the Ober oath, it was argued, encom-
passed committing, attempting to com-
mit, advocating, abetting, advising, etc.,
the alteration of the government by
peaceful revolution and, moreover, mem-
bership in foreign organizations dedi-
cated to peaceful revolution. The court
dismissed this contention, stating :
"It is quite clear from the connota-
tion that 'revolution' as used in Sec-
tion 15 does not mean a peaceful revo-
lution, but means a revolution accom-
plished by force or violence. These
words are to be construed together."11
It was held that the purposes of Article
XV, Section 11 of the Constitution, and
the Ober Law, are identical and thus are
to be taken together to effect that pur-
pose.12
St. Rep. 385; Hays v. Loomis, 84 111. 18. A
statement or declaration reduced to writing,
and sworn to or affirmed before some officer
who has authority to administer an oath or
affirmation. Shelton v. Berry, 19 Tex. 154,
70 Am. Dec. 326 ... ."
10 196 Md. 177, at 189 (1950).
11 196 Md. 177, at 191 (1950).
12 196 Md. 177, at 192 (1950). The court
did not come to grips with the argument that,
by virtue of a provision unique among Ameri-
can constitutions, the people of Maryland are
called upon to reform the old or establish a
new government when "the ends of Govern-
ment are perverted." Article 6 of the Declara-
tion of Rights reads:
"That all persons invested with the
Legislative or Executive powers of Gov-
ernment are the Trustees of the Public,
and, as such, accountable for their conduct.
Wherefore, whenever the ends of Govern-
ment are perverted, and public liberty
manifestly endangered, and all other
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