INTRODUCTION
The veto power was first given to a
governor of Maryland by the Constitu-
tion of 1867. As a preface to Article II,
Section 17, the Convention stated its
intent to provide a "... guard against
hasty or partial legislation and encroach-
ments of the Legislative Department
upon the coordinate Executive and Ju-
dicial Departments. . . ." In deciding
to write an executive veto into the Con-
stitution, Conservative Democrats serv-
ing as delegates were undoubtedly swayed
by their hostility toward the Radical
Republican legislatures that had con-
trolled Maryland during the Civil War
and by their sympathies for President
Andrew Johnson in his then current diffi-
culties with the federal Congress. Unfor-
tunately, the language used in Section 1 7
has presented a number of other difficul-
ties.
SCOPE
Article II, Section 17, is by its terms all
inclusive, stating that ". . . every Bill . . .
shall, before it becomes a law" be subject
to veto by the governor. However, there
are two exceptions to the application of
this section. First, bills passed by three-
fifths of the members of each house sub-
mitting proposed constitutional amend-
ments to the voters, pursuant to Article
XIV of the Constitution, have been held
to be not subject to the approval of the
governor.2 This conclusion was reached
by the majority of a split court with
some difficulty.
1 This article was prepared for the Com-
mission by Garrett Power, Commission reporter
for the Committee on the Executive Depart-
ment; Associate Professor at the University of
Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1960, Duke
University; LL.B., 1962, Duke University;
LL.M., 1965, University of Illinois; member of
the Maryland Bar.
2 Warfield v. Vandiver, 101 Md. 78 (1905).
156
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It is recommended that these proposed
constitutional amendments continue to be
exempt from executive veto and that the
Committee on Elective Franchise and
Declaration of Rights (which is respon-
sible for Article XIV) be acquainted with
the problem of interrelation.
Second, so-called "budget bills" are not
subject to executive veto. The Constitu-
tion was amended in 1916 to include
an executive budget.3 Under this over-
all scheme, now in Article III, Section
52, the governor submits to the General
Assembly a budget for each fiscal year.
The General Assembly may increase or
decrease certain specified items and enact
them into law without further action of
the governor.4 This provision is expressly
given preference over other inconsistent
provisions.5 Supplementary appropriation
bills (i.e., appropriation bills originating
in the General Assembly) are expressly
made subject to the governor's veto.6
It is recommended that the question
of whether the governor should have the
power to veto items in the "budget bill"
should be referred to the Committee on
State Finance and Taxation.
POWER OF GOVERNOR TO SIGN BILLS
INTO LAW AFTER THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY ADJOURNS
"If any bill shall not be returned by
the Governor within six days (Sundays
excepted), after it shall be presented to
him, the same shall be law in like manner
as if he signed it, unless the General As-
sembly shall, by adjournment, prevent its
return, in which case it shall not be
a law."1 (Emphasis added.) As the literal
3 Md. Laws of 1916, ch. 159, ratified Nov.
7, 1916.
4MD. const, art. III, § 52 (6).
5MD. const, art. III, § 52 (14).
6MD. const, art. III, § 52 (8).
7 md. const, art. II, § 17.
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