EXECUTIVE BRANCH
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pected to make sophisticated judgments
about narrow legislative issues without
extensive public education. Hence, there
is a real danger that the results of a
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referendum may be either left to chance
or determined by the relative success of
the public-relations efforts of the gover-
nor and legislature.
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POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO GET ADVISORY OPINIONS FROM THE STATE'S
HIGHEST COURT
A number of states now permit the
governor and/or legislature to get ad-
visory opinions from the state's highest
courts. The following quotation presents
a summary:
"Article 2, ch. 3, of the Constitution
of Massachusetts (1780) provides each
branch of the legislature as well as the
governor and council, shall have au-
thority to require the opinions of the
justices of the supreme judicial court
upon important questions of law, and
upon solemn occasions. There are vari-
ants of this provision in the constitu-
tions of New Hampshire, Maine,
Rhode Island, Florida, Colorado, and
South Dakota. The Missouri Constitu-
tion of 1865 included such a provision
but it was abandoned ten years later.
In at least four states, Delaware, Min-
nesota, Vermont, and Alabama, advis-
ory opinions have been authorized, in
certain circumstances, by statute. See
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In the Matter of the Application of
the Senate, 10 Minn. 78 (1865) (hold-
ing the statute unconstitutional) ; In
re Opinions of the Justices, 209 Ala.
593, 96 So. 487 (1923) (upholding the
statute) . In a few other states advisory
opinions have sometimes been given
without benefit of special authority.
See, generally, Field, The Advisory
Opinion — An Analysis, 24 Ind. L.J.
203 (1949)."8
For two reasons it is recommended that
the governor not be given this power.
First, if judges may give advisory opin-
ions, they will often be called upon to act
before an actual controversy arises. It is-
submitted that the judicial process is
better suited to resolve disputes based on
concrete facts. Second, often no real ad-
versary proceeding will be joined with
all of the concomitant pro-and-con ad-
vantages such a proceeding affords.
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POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO NEGOTIATE AND ENTER INTO
INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Although the Maryland Constitution
is silent, historically the General Assem-
bly has been viewed as that branch of
government with authority to enter into
interstate compacts. From the 1785
Maryland-Virginia Potomac and Chesa-
peake Pact to present-day agreements on
transportation and mental health, the
General Assembly has consistently and
exclusively exercised the State's authority.
Such compacts are legislative in character
and properly issue from the State's "pre-
dominant branch."
8 H. hart & H. wechsler, federal
courts and federal system 80 (1953).
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This traditional allocation of power
does not prevent the governor and the
executive department from playing an
active role in negotiating and executing
interstate compacts. Just as the governor
initiates purely domestic legislation, he
can also institute and present for approval
an interstate agreement. However, there
does appear to be a substantial constitu-
tional obstacle to the governor's assump-
tion of a role of leadership in interstate
cooperation.
It is axiomatic that "except when
authorized by the Constitution, the legis-
lature cannot delegate the power to make
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