defective delinquent, the court shall
. . . order him to be committed . . .
for an indeterminate period without
either maximum or minimum limits."7
Various constitutional attacks have
been made in the courts on the Defec-
tive Delinquent Act, including the inde-
terminate sentence feature of Section
9(b). The courts have held such at-
tacks to be baseless :
A. Although the proceedings are predi-
cated upon a previous conviction for
certain specified criminal offenses, the
accused is not put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense because Article 3 1B is
not a penal statute imposing a new pen-
alty for an established crime or crimes.
It is not a penal statute because the
emphasis is on confinement and treat-
ment rather than punishment or deter-
rence, and because Article 3 IB is like
statutes that provide for a civil inquiry
into the sanity of a person. The char-
acter of the Act is not altered because it
deals only with convicted criminals or
utilizes some methods of criminal law
adjudication and review.8 "A proceeding
under the Defective Delinquent law . . .
is in substantive matters a civil proceed-
ing ... it is the intention of the General
Assembly that such proceedings be
regarded as civil in nature as to proce-
dural matters as well."9
B. The due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment are not violated by the statute.
The attack contended that the length
of confinement under an indeterminate
sentence was unreasonable because of
unjust discrimination between persons
7Mo. code ann. art. 3 IB, §9(b) (1951).
8Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 513-14
(1956).
8 Blizzard v. State, 218 Md. 384, 386
(1958).
130
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in similar circumstances who may not
have been convicted, or have been con-
victed of crimes the penalty for which is
more limited. Since the detention is
civil in nature, Article III Section 60 is
not strictly applicable. A state has the
power to restrain the liberty of persons
found dangerous to the health and
safety of the people. Several states pro-
vide for indefinite confinement of sexual
psychopaths. The length of confinement
does not extend beyond the reasonable
necessity for sequestration. The extent
of detention depends primarily upon
medical findings as to diagnosis and
prognosis, rather than a finding of the
elements of a criminal offense. Deten-
tion is preventive and therapeutic and
not punishment.10
In Sas v. State of Maryland, the fol-
lowing statement is found :
"While the sentence prescribed for
the defective delinquent is fixed by the
law as an indeterminate sentence, it
nevertheless requires yearly adminis-
trative review of his record by the
Patuxent staff and an opportunity to
the petitioner at fixed times to have a
judicial review of his status. The pro-
cedural protection here furnished ex-
ceeds that provided in either the
Minnesota Psychopathic Personality
Statute, or the Virginia Sterilization
Act, both of which were upheld by
the Supreme Court. In the Minne-
sota case . . . the penalty was indeter-
minate confinement but the Court
felt that the right to petition for re-
lease was adequate procedural protec-
tion for this provision of the Act."11
10 Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 515.
11 Sas v. Maryland, 334 Fed.2d 506, 515
(4th Cir.).
Cases referenced: Pearson v. Probate Ct.
309 U.S. 270 (1940). Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927).
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