Disenchanted with the obligations im-
posed upon it by the compact theory and
the resulting loss of state sovereignty,
the State of Florida omitted the idea of
the compact theory from its constitution
in 1865; and Arkansas did likewise in
1868. It is doubtful that the constitu-
tional conventions in these states were
motivated solely by a desire for verbal
simplicity. Even before the civil war
period the compact theory of govern-
ment had been subject to negative
criticism.
It is the aim of this paper to outline
the weaknesses of this theory, to inter-
pret the theory in the light of the history
before and since the age of the enlight-
enment in which the compact theory
thrived, and to suggest whether state-
ments made in 1967 as to the theory's
current validity and the desirability of
its verbal extension are based upon
sound argument.2
It will be advantageous to examine
briefly the historical development of the
1 This article was prepared for the Com-
mission by Stephen J. Perrello, Jr., Cornell
University summer intern with the Constitu-
tional Convention Commission, 1967; B.A.,
1967, Cornell University.
2 See Appendix to this article.
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theory. It is known that the theory's
ultimate fruition in the eighteenth cen-
tury was due to an increased need to
reconcile the enforcement of law with
civil liberty. The record of European
monarchs is by no means so immaculate
as to be beyond reproach. The rule of
King George III of England, in par-
ticular, was subjected to considerable
opposition by the colonists because they
felt inadequately represented in Parlia-
ment. The origins of the compact theory
concept, however, can be established
much before the time of George III.
They can be found in the biblical refer-
ences to David's contract with his people
and in the literature of ancient Greece.
Aristotle de-emphasized the idea of a
contract between the governor and the
governed. Instead, he asserted that man
is "by nature a political animal," whose
association, one with another, produces
protection and commerce; but, more im-
portant, a moral relationship whereby
duty replaces instinct, justice takes on
meaning, and man's highest faculties
have a theatre in which to develop so
that man may be enabled to live the
"Good Life."3 The resulting society, as
Aristotle saw it, was but a necessary
3 aristotle, de regime principum.
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