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of having committed an offense, there is no court clothed with
appellate jurisdiction over that act, save thatjwhich results
from the habeas corpus. But this writ was never designed to
answer the purposes of a writ of error.
If this court had no power to commit upon the charge of
conpiracy, let the case proceed to final judgment, and the case
can be reviewed upon writ of error. If the legality of this
commitment is before you for reviewal, let us see whether we
have shown sufficient cause for their detainer. The law of
riots and unlaw/ul assemblies does not apply here. It is
conspiracy that constitutes the offense here. It is that offense
by which they are detained, and upon which we propose to
put them on trial. I refer to 5 Norris and Johnson 337,
to illustrate what is conspiracy, rather than show that con-
spiracy to do an unlawful act is an indictable offense. The
law punishes the conspiracy to prevent the unlawful act. The
conspiracy constitutes the indictable offense, and that is suffi-
ciently stated upon the face of the warrants. It is not neces-
sary the conspiracy should be executed. The commitment
as originally made out by the clerk, is very brief. It is a
clerical misprison in not stating upon its face the cause of
the commitment. This was discovered before the return, and
the court ordered its correction. My friends ask for the au-
thority of the court to amend its entries and correct the
misprisions of a clerk. All courts of record have that
power.
It is not to make a new charge, or to convert one charge
into another, but to more distinctly charge the offense. I re-
fer to 4 Johnson, 356. That was a case where a habeas cor-
pus was issued to relieve a party from commitment for con-
tempt. It was said the commitment was defective. If the
attachment had been so defective as not to hold the party,
the court could have issued a perfect commitment. If we
were held to the first warrant, and that was defective, your
Honor could quash it and order a proper warrant to be made
out. That conspiracycontemplated a resort to brute force,
and to the use of the posse of sheriff and the bayonets of the
United States force. If that were made out, there would be
probable cause for presuming a breach of the peace. It is
sufficient to confine them upon the charge of contemplating a
breach of the peace until they give bail to release themselves.
If there were any doubt about the sufficiency of the first war-
rants there can be none in regard to the second warrants. I
will concede that you have the power to put the party on
trial before you for his guilt or innocence. Twenty other
Judges of Maryland have the same power. Your determina-
tion against them carries us to Worcester, thence to Wash-
ington and to Somerset, and to all the other judges of Mary-
land, for a continual re-litigation of the case you try.
The extent to which you can be pressed is that the repre-
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