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DELEGATE MUDD: Yes, such as pro-
bate or juvenile, in that area.
THE CHAIRMAN: Any further ques-
tions?
Delegate Dukes.
DELEGATE DUKES: Under the func-
tional division provision for district court
could you also set up a functional division
that would deal in the nature of small
claims court, so that the division would
deal with informal rules, informal proce-
dure, limited amount as well as category
of type of claims?
DELEGATE MUDD: You mean func-
tional division that was not bound by the
rules of the district court?
DELEGATE DUKES: Many of our
present peoples' courts have relatively in-
formal rules, so that a man who claims
his neighbor owes him $150 can try his
own case.
Could you set up a division of the dis-
trict court to do this?
DELEGATE MUDD: No. The functional
division of the district courts would have
to abide by the same rules within its
limited function as the district courts.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mudd, as I
understand the question of Delegate Dukes,
it is two-fold. One, under your plan could
a district court be set up so that a function
would be small claims, as distinguished
from a type of case? That is the first ques-
tion.
DELEGATE MUDD: Yes. I see no prob-
lem there.
THE CHAIRMAN: The second part of
his question was, could the court, under its
rule making power, authorize the use of
more informal procedures in such a small
claims court?
DELEGATE MUDD: Offhand I would
say no, but the rule making power possibly
could so provide.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Dukes.
DELEGATE DUKES: Would I con-
clude, if your answer in the negative is
correct, that there is no provision for such
a court under this article?
DELEGATE MUDD: No provision for
what?
DELEGATE DUKES: For the small
claims court with an informal system.
Could there be none under this article?
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DELEGATE MUDD: Absolutely yes,
there could be. I am not prepared to say it
would be operated under rules different
from those of the court of which it was a
functional division.
DELEGATE DUKES: Delegate Bam-
berger's last question, as I recall, dealt with
whether or not it was the basic intention
to have functional divisions as a function
of rule making rather than legislative.
You felt the courts were in a better posi-
tion to determine when a functional divi-
sion was necessary, is that right?
DELEGATE MUDD: Yes.
DELEGATE DUKES: And the Chair,
I believe, stated a question in response to
Delegate Willoner's inquiry about any dif-
ference if there was any between judicial
power under section 5.01 and judicial func-
tion, I suppose in a quasi-judicial body
such as an administrative agency. My ques-
tion is this: Could the legislature set up a
body — take probate courts, you mentioned
that — set up a body which is called a court
and upon which is conferred commission or
probate jurisdiction, have judges appointed
by the governor, called presiding officers
but have no function other than judicial in
any reasonable sense, and remove all pro-
bate functions from the judicial arm?
DELEGATE MUDD: I think the an-
swer to that is no, because presumably
there would be a conflict of jurisdiction. If
the legislature in the exercise of the power
delegated to it to prescribe the jurisdic-
tion of the four-tier system prescribes pro-
bate jurisdiction in the superior court, that
would be the end of it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Dukes.
DELEGATE DUKES: What is the ef-
fect of the article on the present tax court?
DELEGATE MUDD: It is not a court,
as I understand it.
DELEGATE DUKES: What are its
functions other than judicial?
DELEGATE MUDD: You mean the
court operated out of the department of
assessments and taxation?
DELEGATE DUKES: The court is
called a tax court, yes, sir.
DELEGATE MUDD: My understanding
is it is not a court in our definition of it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Dukes.
DELEGATE DUKES: Am I not correct
that in decisions which deal with quasi-
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