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any of the other delegates, I wonder, Dele-
gate Mudd, if I could have you revert to
the question asked by Delegate Willoner
and ask you if you would not elaborate on
it or if you would say whether the follow-
ing statement by the Chair would be a
proper elaboration.
DELEGATE MUDD: What section?
THE CHAIRMAN: Dealing with 5.01.
That is that the same reasons which were
assigned by the courts in holding that
quasi-judicial agencies were not exercising
a judicial function under the separation of
powers doctrine would be the reason behind
your answer that the quasi-judicial agency
would not be exercising judicial function
in contravention of section 5.01.
DELEGATE MUDD: Thank you for
helping me, sir. Exactly.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Chabot.
DELEGATE CHABOT: I would like to
continue along that line. Does that mean
then it would be within the competence of
the General Assembly to determine that,
say, auto injury cases should be taken out
of the judicial system and be handled by a
newly created agency which would deter-
mine the respective rights of the parties
in those cases.
DELEGATE MUDD: You mean tort
cases or traffic violations?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Chabot.
DELEGATE CHABOT: Either.
DELEGATE MUDD: I think it is possi-
ble for the legislature to provide for an
agency to deal with the revocation and
suspension of licenses for motor vehicle
violations if that is responsive to your
question.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Chabot.
DELEGATE CHABOT: That only re-
^sponds to part of the question. Could they
also say that we are disturbed at the tre-
mendous amount of time, use of jury trials,
and so on with regard to auto injury cases
and take the auto injury cases out and
give them to a specialized agency.
DELEGATE MUDD: No, because, I
think, that has been accomplished or has
been discussed in some jurisdictions, so I
am told, through a master branch of the
trial court, for instance. There is delegated
to a master or some agency of court the
matter of determining the monetary loss
or damages, but not the exercise of the
judicial power in the matter.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Chabot, do
you have a further question?
DELEGATE CHABOT: Yes, still along
this line. The United States Constitution
has similar language except for the use of
the word exclusively, and yet has created
a number of non-Article III courts or agen-
cies which handle cases exactly like the
cases handled in the regular court system.
I refer to the customs and patent court,
United States tax court and for quite a
while the court of claims, which was held
to be a non-Article III court.
Would you say that the use of the word
exclusively would make that impossible
here?
DELEGATE MUDD: I cannot answer
your question in relation to the federal
system, but some of those functions you
mentioned are, I believe, non-judicial.
THE CHAIRMAN: Any further ques-
tion, Delegate Chabot?
DELEGATE CHABOT: Yes. Let me go
to a different topic. Did you indicate that
commissioners could be non-lawyers?
DELEGATE MUDD: Yes.
DELEGATE CHABOT: Did the Com-
mittee feel that it was wise even within
the limitations of the rule-making power to
permit non-lawyers to make determinations
as to arrest warrants in view of the con-
stitutional problems?
DELEGATE MUDD: Yes, but that will,
I am sure, require someone with knowledge
and instructions.
THE CHAIRMAN: Any further ques-
tions Delegate Chabot?
DELEGATE CHABOT: Yes, sir. With
regard to the use of the word resident in
sections 5.08 and 5.10, we have met the
word in the legislative article and we will
meet it in the suffrage and elections article.
Is this to be necessarily the same concept
we find in those articles or may this be a
different concept.
DELEGATE MUDD: Our Committee
considered the use of the word "resident,"
and also "domicile" and "citizen," and we
adopted the word "resident" as being the
most descriptive of what we intended.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Chabot.
DELEGATE CHABOT: But then this
may be something that is different from a
resident for purposes of the legislative
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