this compulsive, affirmative action by the
General Assembly, that they shall do as the
recommendation provides.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bennett.
DELEGATE BENNETT: We should re-
new this when we enter the legislature. We
will see this thing through, won't we?
DELEGATE BOYER: I am afraid I
will no longer be in the legislature.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: You have in-
dicated this is a self-executing provision. I
would like you to give us an example of
how you would envision this provision be-
ing enforced by the courts, if you could
give us an example.
DELEGATE BOYER: Yes, sir.
Since the constitution has prescribed the
salary, the court said in one case that the
people had directed the payment of that
salary, and if the appropriate voucher had
been submitted, the treasurer had a minis-
terial duty to pay it. This would seem to
imply that if an unfulfilled Constitutional
mandate on the legislature must be fol-
lowed by some other state official without
legislative action, the courts would compel
the state official to act, or the General As-
sembly.
DELEGATE WILLONER: I understand
the concept of mandamus in a specific area.
Let's take, for example, the wetlands. As-
suming a private developer started to drain
our wetlands and develop a resort com-
munity, at that point could we sue the de-
veloper and enjoin his development on the
ground that the legislature failed to pro-
tect that particular wetland?
DELEGATE BOYER: Could we sue—
you mean an interested taxpayer—sue
whom?
DELEGATE WILLONER: Could the in-
terested taxpayer enjoin the developer from
developing the land on the ground that the
legislature failed to carry out the mandate
of the constitution?
DELEGATE BOYER: There is not a
thing to prevent any aggrieved taxpayer
from filing a suit against anybody?
DELEGATE WILLONER: Is this not
an entirely new concept of law?
DELEGATE BOYER: If it is, I think
it is a good one.
DELEGATE HICKMAN: Mr. Chair-
man. |
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hickman.
DELEGATE HICKMAN: Mr. Boyer, to
what degree, or how extensively in this
field do you think the legislature would
have to go each year to meet the require-
ments of this particular provision? Could
they do one-fourth as much as they are
doing now and meet the requirements?
DELEGATE BOYER: That is a matter
of relative degree, I think, Delegate Hick-
man. I think the answer would be they
would have to go to the degree that public
interest demanded.
THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any fur-
ther questions?
DELEGATE BOYER: That would dif-
fer with various situations.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Groh.
DELEGATE GROH: Delegate Boyer,
was it the intention of the Committee to
broaden or extend the scope of the police
power; in other words, create another area
besides health, welfare, et cetera?
DELEGATE BOYER: No, Delegate
Groh. Our sole intention was to provide
protection for natural resouces.
THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any fur-
ther questions for purposes of clarification?
Delegate Boyer, the last answer leaves
me in some confusion as a result of an
earlier answer.
I thought you had said earlier in re-
sponse to questions from Delegate Taylor
that the purpose of conservation of natural
resources, natural environment and natural
scenic beauty was for the citizens of the
State, and I understood you to be saying
perhaps to the contrary in your answer to
Delegate Groh. Could you clear that up for
us?
DELEGATE BOYER: Yes, sir.
Our answer to Delegate Taylor was our
answer of the Committee. Delegate Groh
got into another field about the extension
of police power. In my answer to Delegate
Taylor it inevitably follows that police
power is extended, and to that exent I
would have to agree with Delegate Groh;
but we did not get into the extension of
police power, per se. We were considering
solely the protection of our natural re-
sources as opposed to man made resources.
THE CHAIRMAN: I understood Dele-
gate Groh's question was whether or not
you were intending protection of natural |
