DELEGATE BARD: Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bard.
DELEGATE BARD: Ladies and gentle-
men:
First let me say I hope some of that
green stuff that appeared on the last occa-
sion is still around after mine.
I would like to present the Minority Re-
port LB-1F. Our minority report proposes
that "The General Assembly shall meet in
regular annual sessions, convening on the
third Wednesday of January of each year,
unless otherwise prescribed by law."
Actually, I would like to make this clear
—it is important—we can hardly call this
the minority report. The vote in our Com-
mittee was ten in favor of this report, and
ten in favor of what is called the majority
report.
In fact, the Chairman of our Committee
was for this report and had some good
logical reasons for his support. I plan to
embody some our Chairman's good thoughts
into the presentation today.
I hope you will vote for the Chairman's
ideas, not his eloquence.
It is important to note that our LB-IF
Minority Report differs from the Majority
Report only on the question of how the
length of the session shall be determined.
In opening the debate on LB-IF I would
like to make it clear that the main point
is the bringing before the Committee of
the Whole the chief advantages that come
through a legislatively determined session.
We would like to call it a flexible session.
The proponents of the Minority Report
want to make it clear that we are not
speaking about a continuous session as
such, nor are we necessarily speaking about
requiring full time service which would not
permit attention to one's chosen profession.
Our main point is that the constitution
should permit a flexible schedule that
might bring the short session on one occa-
sion, and a somewhat longer one on an-
other occasion, as time and problems re-
quire.
The principal reason for permitting the
General Assembly to set its own session
length is the fundamental belief in the
ability and integrity of the legislature to
set its own schedule. The General Assem-
bly is responsible enough, we believe, to
rule itself and does not need a constitu-
tional deadline in order to maintain legis-
lative discipline. |
As the Citizens Commission on Mary-
land Government makes clear, we are giv-
ing increasing support to the idea of a
strong executive and a strong judicial de-
partment.
In giving both these branches of the gov-
ernment more power, should we not at the
same time give more power to the legis-
lative department, if the concept of checks
and balances is to hold?
It is true that a legislature faced with
the constitutional deadline for adjournment
may have a spur to action, but forced ac-
tion is often precipitous and unwise. Legis-
latively determined sessions would end the
log jam of hastily passed bills during the
last two weeks of the constitutionally lim-
ited session.
In the 1965 and 1966 sessions of the
Maryland legislature, 80 percent of the
bills were enacted in the rush of the last
two weeks. Legislatively determined ses-
sions would permit the General Assembly
to adjust its session length to its workload,
and would avoid the pressure and inevit-
able mistakes of the last-minute log jam. I
could give you some illustrations of some
of these errors.
A legislative-determined session would
also eliminate the need to amend the con-
stitution at a future date when a 90 day
session proved woefully inadequate. His-
tory has shown the time requirement for
legislative session changes frequently. In
recent years Maryland has changed from
biennial sessions to annual sessions; then
from a 60-day session alternating with a
30-day session to a straight 70-day session
every year.
Even now the legislature itself is asking
for further change to 90 days. Certainly a
rule of state government that has changed
so frequently in the past should not be put
in the constitution where it cannot be easily
changed in the future.
Another argument in favor of a legis-
latively determined session is it strengthens
the position of the legislature vis-a-vis the
governor. With limited sessions the gover-
nor becomes virtually all-powerful in state
government after the date when the legis-
lature is constitutionally forced to adjourn.
The limited session strengthens the gov-
ernor's veto, because all legislation vetoed
after the legislature adjourns is not im-
mediately subject to the General Assembly
overriding the veto. The governor's veto is
a pocket veto, and makes him the most
powerful legislator of all. |
