used in the presentation oath. It historic-
ally was used for the benefit of those
people who actually believed in the Divin-
ity and the theistic concept of philosophy,
but who did not choose to take an oath be-
cause of religious qualms of conscience
about swearing, and therefore it was ap-
proved and put into the Constitution of
the United States. However, it has con-
tinued under the same concept and—and
to reply to your question as to whether or
not there was actually a belief in Divin-
ity—would be substituted for and would be
considered as a part of the oath, without
the belief in a Divine Being.
THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any
further questions? Delegate Henderson?
DELEGATE HENDERSON: Along that
same line, it is my understanding that the
affirmation was substituted for the oath,
not for the benefit of the non-believer, but
for those who were so conscientiously
scrupulous that they declined, or they
thought it was wrong to mention the name
of the Maker.
Now, if it is the Committee's opinion
that a non-believer would be eligible to of-
fice under this phrase, as you have drawn
it, I suggest that should be stated in the
comment at least. I do not find anywhere
a clear statement to that effect, because it
may be of the utmost importance when this
case, as it undoubtedly will, comes before
the court and particularly the Supreme
Court for interpretation.
THE CHAIRMAN: .So that the tran-
script may be clear on this point, I would
like to ask Delegate Boyer as Chairman of
the Committee to state unequivocably if he
can whether the opinion of the Committee
was, as Judge Henderson just indicated,
that the oath or affirmation could be taken
by the person who did not believe in a Su-
preme Being, and that belief in a Supreme
Being was therefore not under this section
at least, a qualification for office.
DELEGATE BOYER: There are no dis-
criminations in the section as we present
it that would allow special privileges to
any particular class, and it would have to
be taken, in our opinion, by everyone.
THE CHAIRMAN: I am not sure that
that is an answer to the question of the
Chair. The question is, did the Committee
on General Provisions intend by this pro-
posal that a person who did not believe in
a Supreme Being could nevertheless take
the oath or affirmation required by this
section and could nevertheless hold an |
elected or appointive office under the con-
stitution and laws of this State.
DELEGATE BOYER: Yes, they did
consider it, and yes, they can hold office.
There are two questions there.
THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any
further questions for purposes of clarifica-
tion? Delegate Blair?
DELEGATE BLAIR: Mr. Chairman, I
would like to call the attention of the Com-
mittee of the Whole to the very well
written opinion of the attorney general's
office, which was dated November 2, 1965.
The opinion was written by Morton Sachs,
an assistant attorney general, following the
Schowgurow case, and it is an excellent
piece of work, which covers the whole phi-
losophy of what is under discussion, that
is, the background of the oath and the
transition from the belief in God to the
present concept, as defined in Schowgurow
and Torcaso. It would be my belief, after
you read this particular opinion—and it
can be obtained from the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, and I will be pleased to fur-
nish every member here who will ask for
a copy with a copy of it—that it will com-
pletely answer all the questions that have
been requested of the Chairman, Mr.
Boyer, with relation to the applicability of
the affirmation, and whether or not it is a
substitute for the belief in a Divine Being.
It is covered in this particular article, and
the answer is in the affirmative.
THE CHAIRMAN: I think for purposes
of clarification of the record, Delegate
Blair, it might be desirable if you would
indicate what you meant by your last state-
ment, that the answer is in the affirmative.
DELEGATE BLAIR: That the affirma-
tion would encompass an oath taken by an
atheist.
THE CHAIRMAN: In other words, that
the oath, or the taking of the oath, did not
impose a condition that the person elected
or appointed to office believed in the Su-
preme Being?
DELEGATE BLAIR: That is correct,
sir.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bennett?
DELEGATE BENNETT: Would the
Chairman of the Committee be good enough
to explain the significance of the decision
of the Supreme Court today, Whitehill v.
Elkins, upon this situation? Does the ma-
jority opinion forever lay to rest the Ober
oath? |
