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THE CHAIRMAN: The pages will dis-
tribute Amendment J.
This will be Amendment No. 3.
The Clerk will read the amendment.
READING CLERK: Amendment No. 3
to Committee Recommendation No. GP-13
by Delegates Johnson and Rybczynski:
On page 2, section 3, Delayed Effect of
Certain Sections, strike out all of subsec-
tion (e), comprising all of lines 46, 47
and 48.
THE CHAIRMAN: The amendment is
submitted by Delegate Johnson, seconded
by Delegate Rybczynski.
The Chair recognizes Delegate Johnson.
DELEGATE JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman,
ladies and gentlemen, I shall be very brief.
All of the reasons for striking section A
and all the reasons for not striking section
A are applicable, with one very important
difference. In particular, in section A we
were talking about property damage. We
were talking about alleged damages as a
result of taking of property.
The reason that we, in spite of the last
vote, submitted this section is because there
is quite a difference between the two sec-
tions. In sovereign immunity we are talk-
ing, for all practical purposes, about tort
claims, injuries.
This Constitutional Convention saw fit,
and properly so, to put a provision in the
constitution which affected the State's right
to plead sovereign immunity. I think that
was a very, very good step forward, but to
delay this for one year and a half, which
although it gives the legislature an oppor-
tunity to set guidelines, what about the in-
juries and damages?
We are talking about human life and
limbs now, ladies and gentlemen, and I
do not mean to become dramatic about this.
I am not trying to frighten my votes, but
I am concerned about the very practical
application to this section.
It seems totally improper and totally un-
fair to me to create a right and to delay for
a year and a half, which will cause and
create suffering by individuals, that they
probably will not recover, because the State
in that year and a half will be able to
plead sovereign immunity.
I do not want to take part in a proceed-
ing which, while purporting to give rights
to all the citizens of the State, is going to
delay the right for a year and a half, just
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to give the legislature a little more time
to define the right. I submit that the leg-
islature will define the right as of July 1,
1968.
I do not want to take part in seeing
injury and damages caused to children, to
adults, and then have to explain to them
that if that injury or damage would have
occurred after January 1, 1970, they would
have been entitled to recovery, but because
their injury or damage occurred between
July 1, 1968, and January 1, 1970, they are
not entitled to the recovery because the
State can plead sovereign immunity.
Citizens of this State have waited well
over a hundred years for a section of this
nature and to delay another year and a
half, after providing for it in the constitu-
tion, is a serious mistake.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Mr. Chairman,
ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, I
rise to urge that you defeat this amend-
ment and I must give you some of the
background.
The Committee on Personal Rights and
Preamble debated this question long and
hard. We discussed it at great length from
the point of view that this was a very
new and serious step in the State of Mary-
land.
I think we pointed out to this Committee
of the Whole that this has been accom-
plished in three ways in this country: (1),
it has been done by constitutional conven-
tions, with some kind of limitations, in
order to permit the State to get prepared
for it; (2), in a few States it was done by
court decisions, in specific areas; and (3),
it has been done by the legislature in other
states.
Now, this is not just a tort action con-
cept that Delegate Johnson is bringing
forth to you. It goes much further than
that. It involves contractual matters in
which the State is involved. It involves
suits against the State Roads Department
for contractual matters, it involves every
kind of conceivable action.
When the Committee debated this thing,
there was considerable doubt as to whether
this matter should be put in the constitu-
tion at all. When it was decided to put
it in, there was no question in everybody's
mind that there must be a reasonable op-
portunity for the legislature to define the
scope of liability by way of making what-
ever saving it wanted to. I know of no
state where there is a complete and abso-
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