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It will also provide that in other criminal
cases there will be a removal only in ac-
cordance with the rules of the court or the
General Assembly, and I believe this is ade-
quate and fair and proper. It seems satis-
factory to everybody.
THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any fur-
ther discussion?
Delegate Marion.
DELEGATE MARION: A question of
Delegate Kiefer.
THE CHAIRMAN : Do any delegates not
have a copy of the amendment?
Delegate Marion.
DELEGATE MARION: My question
was directed to Delegate Kiefer.
THE CHAIRMAN: State the question.
DELEGATE MARION: Is my under-
standing of this amendment correct? This
gives the capital cases, either the State or
the defendant the automatic right —
THE CHAIRMAN: Gives to whom?
DELEGATE MARION: Either to the
State or the defendant an automatic right
of removal from the county in which the
prosecution is brought.
THE CHAIRMAN: I am not sure I
understand what you mean by "automatic
right of removal." You mean an absolute
right, not a matter of privilege?
DELEGATE MARION: Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Yes. This al-
ready exists now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mudd, I
have a hazy recollection that there was
some provision in the judicial article that
a defendant was entitled to be tried in the
county where the offense was committed.
I may be wrong about it.
DELEGATE MUDD: I do not recollect
any. I will check.
THE CHAIRMAN: Very well.
Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: I have a question
for Delegate Kiefer.
THE CHAIRMAN: State the question.
DELEGATE MASON: In reference to
the sentence on line 12, where it says "All
other criminal cases may be removed only
as permitted by the Court of Appeals by
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rule or the General Assembly by law," I am
wondering whether that "only" precludes
removal for a show of prejudice?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: It means what
it says, I am afraid. It means that they
could be removed only as set out by rule
or by law. I would assume that in case of
prejudice that this would be valid.
Let me refer you to Delegate Willoner,
who is more familiar with the specifics on
this matter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: It is unneces-
sary to provide for that, because that is
part of the due process concept in a fair
trial.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason, do
you have another question?
DELEGATE MASON: I wonder whether
this is not in conflict with that due process
part of the Constitution, by limiting re-
moval only to cases permitted by the rule
of the General Assembly?
THE CHAIRMAN : Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: Well, it is
not intended to be in conflict with that. I
will put it that way.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mason.
DELEGATE MASON: I have no fur-
ther question but it appears confusing.
THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any further
questions?
Delegate Mudd, I think what the Chair
was thinking of was an earlier draft of
some predecessor to section 5 of R&P-1.
There was in an earlier draft a provision
that the accused was entitled to trial by an
impartial jury in the county where the
crime was perpetuated. It is not there now.
Delegate Bamberger.
DELEGATE BAMBERGER: Mr. Chair-
man, I would suggest the question Delegate
Mason raised may have some validity, and
I would ask the proposers of this amend-
ment if they would agree to omit the last
sentence. It is not necessary. The Court of
Appeals, under its rule making power, and
the General Assembly, under its rule mak-
ing power for the Courts, would always
have that right.
I think we are stating something which
is unnecessary in the Constitution, and if
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