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and I do not think it came out very well.
The facts of the situation were fairly com-
plicated. The facts were in dispute, and
the law was in dispute. It was a murder
case. The better verdict would have been
manslaughter. The person was convicted of
second degree murder.
But the situation was remedied by the
sentence, so it was not the difference be-
tween acquittal and a conviction. However,
I think the situation may not have arisen
if the prosecutor were not expected to
argue law, as well as fact.
DELEGATE JAMES (presiding) : For
what purpose does Delegate Anderson rise?
DELEGATE ANDERSON: I rise to
speak against the amendment and in favor
of the majority report.
DELEGATE JAMES (presiding) : Dele-
gate Anderson.
DELEGATE ANDERSON: Mr. Chair-
man, as the former state's attorney in Anne
Arundel County for a number of years,
and as a practicing attorney for a good
many years, I would like to say that I
found the jury system in the trial of crimi-
nal cases satisfactory, whether I was de-
fending or prosecuting.
I think I can conscientiously say that
during the entire period of time when I
was state's attorney, I never knew of an
innocent man convicted, or a guilty one
escaping.
I think that the criminal law, and es-
pecially with a trained or experienced
prosecutor, is comparatively simple. You
can read the basic law to him, you can
explain it to him. You can read it out of
the book to him, and likewise the defense
can do the same thing, and therefore I
feel, speaking purely from experience, that
I think it would be a mistake to take this
provision out of our Constitution.
I have noticed people here in this Con-
vention watching their personal and civil
rights mighty carefully, and I warn them
that this would be a grave mistake, both
for the people as well as the accused.
DELEGATE JAMES (presiding) : For
what purpose does Delegate Sherbow rise?
DELEGATE SHERBOW: I am not
really certain I accept the answer that
was given by Delegate Moser —
DELEGATE JAMES (presiding) : I do
not believe Delegate Anderson is finished.
DELEGATE SHERBOW: I beg your
pardon.
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DELEGATE JAMES (presiding) : Dele-
gate Anderson, please finish.
DELEGATE ANDERSON: I have about
finished. I will not take the time to detail
those things that were mentioned by Dele-
gate Moser, but I think I owe it to the
people to say that I certainly hope that
they will retain this privilege that they
have in criminal cases.
DELEGATE JAMES (presiding) : For
what purpose does Delegate Sherbow rise?
DELEGATE SHERBOW: For the pur-
pose of perhaps giving a different answer
from the one given by Delegate Moser to
Delegate Sollins' question. I call the Con-
vention's attention to the fact that under
section 5.01 of the judicial branch, we have
provided that the judicial power of the
State is vested exclusively in the unified
judicial system. I would suggest that under
the terms of that entire article, all judicial
power being vested in the court, that the
legislature would not have the power to
vest a jury with the power to make itself
a judge of the law in any case.
DELEGATE JAMES (presiding) : Dele-
gate Mason, do you wish to speak in favor?
DELEGATE MASON: Yes, sir.
DELEGATE JAMES (presiding) : You
may proceed.
DELEGATE MASON: I rise to speak
in favor of the amendment, Mr. Chairman.
I have had the opportunity of trying to
uphold this particular section of the Con-
stitution on many occasions in the Court
of Appeals, and in the federal courts, and
we have been successful, so far, but I sug-
gest that if the Supreme Court ever hears
argument and receives briefs on this par-
ticular section, I feel that they will declare
it unconstitutional.
Now, Maryland and Indiana are the only
two states that have this particular section.
This theory that the jury shall be the
judge of the law has been decisively re-
jected by the Supreme Court and all the
federal court systems.
The reasons for the unpopularity of this
provision is its fundamental unfairness. It
denies the right of the accused to be tried
by the fixed law of the land, it fosters un-
certainty in the law, it places the function
of legal interpretation in the hands of per-
sons who are unqualified for such a func-
tion. It fails to provide the accused of due
notice of the crimes of which he is charged,
and of which he may be convicted, or even
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