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While we have approved the four-tier
system, we should not abandon any rights
that Maryland citizens have today as un-
necessary. That is why we came up with
this committee amendment and that is why
we would oppose Delegate Scanlan's re-
moval of the provision altogether.
It has been in the Constitution since
1805. The Court of Appeals had said that
the State of Maryland has always thought
this was such an important matter that in
1805 an amendment was proposed and this
amendment has been carried on in various
forms since then. It is not a minor right,
and it is a right that we think should be
continued.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding) :
Delegate Henderson.
DELEGATE HENDERSON: I rise to
speak in favor of the Scanlan amendment.
As far as the right of removal is con-
cerned, the point can always be raised un-
der the due process clause if there is a
likelihood of prejudice growing out of any
particular situation in the community.
Now, the matter is presently within the
power. It is a procedural matter. It is
within the joint power of the legislature
and the Court of Appeals to implement this
right of removal by rule and that rule can
be altered if the legislature disapproved
of the rule enacted by the Court of Ap-
peals. It is within that joint operation
which we have approved in the judicial
branch.
I suggest that the Committee recom-
mendation which would limit it to rule by
the Court of Appeals would strip the legis-
lature of that joint authority. I would
prefer to see it taken out of the constitu-
tion altogether as the Scanlan amendment
proposed,
I might say one more word in connection
with this. The absolute right of removal
which exists under the present Constitu-
tion has been more abused than any pro-
vision in the Constitution. Cases have been
ready for trial and at the last moment by
this absolute right of removal, this affidavit
comes in. It has been used as a delaying
tactic all over the State by counsel for
insurance companies and others, but par-
ticularly in that field I would say.
It seems to me that the matter should be
left in the joint authority of the legislature
and the Court of Appeals insofar as it may
go beyond the protection afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. I would urge you
to support the Scanlan amendment.
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DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
The Chair recognizes Delegate Child to
speak against the amendment.
DELEGATE CHILD: Mr. Chairman, I
rise to speak against the amendment for
the simple reason that Delegate Willoner's
amendment is really re-writing the section
which is now section 8. We have been asked
to remove section 8, without really getting
the combined and last judgment of the
Committee on it.
I think that the Committee ought to look
at section 8 which Delegate Willoner's
amendment is a substitute for before they
vote section 8 down.
Now, I will agree that we recognize that
this rule in the Willoner amendment has
been abused but we give the Court of Ap-
peals the right to limit that rule. We had
in mind that the Court of Appeals if a
party wanted to move a civil case should
give notice so many days before the case is
set for trial so that there would be no
surprise on the other side and no injustice
done. But I do not think that we should
eliminate section 8 until we see what
Willoner and the other members of the
Committee have agreed upon as a substi-
tute for section 8.
For that reason, I oppose the Scanlan
amendment.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate James.
DELEGATE JAMES: Mr. Chairman
and fellow delegates: I want to argue for
the Scanlan amendment with all the ear-
nestness that I can muster.
I have practiced law since 1937 and I
can say that over that period of time it is
my considered opinion that the use of the
power to remove has been an implement
in the obstruction of justice. Anyone with
experience in this field knows that it is
very seldom used to really get a fair trial.
It is used simply to delay and how can you
have a good system of administration of
justice when you have built into it a ready-
made system of delay.
Now, the present law is rather incon-
gruous. It refused to grant an absolute
right of removal in serious criminal cases,
but it gives an absolute right of removal in
civil cases.
In other words, where a man may be in-
carcerated, the matter of removal is strictly
in the discretion of the court, whereas if
the matter involves property, no matter how
small the amount of property involved,
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