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Delegate Marvin Smith.
DELEGATE M. SMITH: Delegate
Bothe, I am sure down at law school you
heard Professor Reno, on more than one
occasion, say we have got to get on. Do
you think maybe it is time to get on to
debate?
DELEGATE BOTHE: I have no con-
trol over the questions. I would be de-
lighted to sit down.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Groh.
DELEGATE GROH: Delegate Bothe,
do you subscribe to the basic premise that
the function of the Declaration of Rights
is to set out those rights which individuals
hold secure against governmental interfer-
ence or transgression?
THE CHAIRMAN : Delegate Bothe.
DELEGATE BOTHE: No, I do not fully
subscribe to that precept. I think that the
Declaration of Rights is an instrument in-
tended to protect the individual in his
relationships with other individuals which
the State ultimately must regulate.
I do not feel that the Declaration of
Rights must or can remain silent when the
major activity, the occupation of the people
is somewhere else and when you have em-
ployees who are larger than the State,
whose positions affect the daily lives of the
citizens of the State to a much greater or
equal degree as the activities of the State
itself. I feel that the constitution can deal
with them, and I point out to you, Delegate
Groh, interestingly enough, that in consti-
tutions, with the exception of that of Ha-
waii, in which the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively is stated,
it is in the Declaration of Rights.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Groh.
DELEGATE GROH: Then I take it that
you are not in favor of including any other
areas where we designate rights of one
individual against another individual?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bothe.
DELEGATE BOTHE: Could you give
me an example?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Groh.
DELEGATE GROH: For instance, Win-
hard v. Tennant.
DELEGATE BOTHE: I do not think
that belongs in the Declaration of Rights.
Our constitution does not deal with a num-
ber of them. For instance, under free
speech you deal with libel and give a citi-
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zen a right of action against another for
his use of free speech.
The constitution cannot be pure on this
subject matter. The State is what must
effectuate the right. If you have the right,
it is the courts and the executive and the
various aspects of government that make
it a reality.
THE CHAIRMAN : Delegate Hutchinson.
DELEGATE HUTCHINSON: Delegate
Bothe, under your provision, if your pro-
visions happen to be adopted by this Con-
vention, what recourse would a small em-
ployer have?
I am thinking of a particular example.
If a man owns a laundry and he has
twenty employees and the employees bar-
gain collectively, and he cannot meet their
demands, and they refuse to work, what
recourse does he have? Can he fire them
and hire someone else?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bothe.
DELEGATE BOTHE: Of course he can.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hutchinson.
DELEGATE HUTCHINSON: Could
they pursue their case to the court and
say that he refused to allow them to bar-
gain collectively?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bothe.
DELEGATE BOTHE: As an attorney
representing all kinds of people, I have had
people come to me and want to go to court.
You can file suit on any ground. As far as
the guarantee is concerned, it certainly
does not require employers to hire people
who do not do the jobs. It only forbids
employers from firing them because they
want to organize and bargain collectively.
THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any other
questions?
Delegate Hostetter.
DELEGATE HOSTETTER: Just one
further question. In the National Labor
Relations Act, is it not a fact that if notice
is given to the employer by the employees
that they wish to 'negotiate, no threats
whatsoever can be made to the employees
after that particular time?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bothe.
DELEGATE BOTHE: I think you mis-
construed the Act. No threats can ever be
made to employees for their union activity
before or after, nor should any ever occur.
THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any fur-
ther questions?
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