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refused to either recognize .the union or to
sit down and engage in collective bar-
gaining.
The court held that the plaintiffs, that
is, the working men, were entitled to pre-
ventive relief in enjoining the employer
from taking any action against them; but
they were not entitled to mandatory relief
requiring the employer to sit down and
bargain. The relief to which they are en-
titled is to have the rights of those em-
ployees who voluntarily choose to organize
with them for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining protected from coercion.
The court then went on to say that the
constitutional provision was not a little
Labor Relations Act, that it was, instead, a
declaration of a fundamental right of in-
dividuals. They said it was self-executing
to the extent that all provisions of the Bill
of Rights were self-executing. That is that
any governmental action in violation of the
right was void as that between individuals.
Because the Constitution declared a right,
the violation of which is a legal wrong,
there was every available appropriate
remedy to redress or prevent its violation;
however, the constitutional provisions re-
quired no affirmative duties concerning the
right and only remedies could be applied
to their violation. Does that explain to you
what the legal consequences unadorned
might be?
DELEGATE DUKES: I think perhaps
the word you are groping for is yes or no.
Would it be the position of the minority
that this specific language adopted in the
proposed constitution should or should not
permit mandatory relief to compel an em-
ployer to give his best efforts for compul-
sory bargaining?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bothe.
DELEGATE BOTHE: I cannot answer
it in one word, Delegate Dukes. On the
basis of the case I just cited to you, I do
not think it is likely that the outcome
would be any different, that it would be
possible to go to court and construe this
matter as an affirmative ground for relief.
However, I would not want the history of
this debate to tie the appropriate court.
If the time should come, I think the court
would have to consider the case on its own
merits perhaps using this Missouri Case
as a guide.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Maurer.
DELEGATE MAURER: Delegate Bothe,
I have some questions on recognition. You
say that employees have a right to or-
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ganize and to bargain collectively. I am a
member of a local school system where we
have three teachers' organizations. They
would all like to bargain collectively, but
the problem is, in practice, you can truly
only negotiate with one group.
Now, if this were in the constitution and
if legislation on the matter did not exist
as it does exist now, would the three or-
ganizations not have a right to claim that
we should negotiate with all three?
DELEGATE BOTHE: The answer I
would give you is no, because the state-
ment is, "through representatives of their
own choosing," employees' choosing, a ma-
jority of the employees. In Baltimore City,
as I am sure you are aware, Delegate
Maurer, we had at least two organizations
of teachers. There was a strike which oc-
curred because one organization felt that
it was the representative of the majority
and should have recognition. The strike
was settled on the basis that an election
would be called and that the school authori-
ties would sit down with the union proving
itself, as one did, to represent a majority.
Certainly, this provision does not mean
that at any time two or more employees
get together and want to represent them-
selves, that it would be the obligation of
the employer, be it public or private, to go
through full-scale bargaining negotiations.
DELEGATE MAURER: You say
"through representatives of their own
choosing," means not their choosing their
negotiating team, but there must be an
election; but could there be some other
means in the implementing legislation such
as choosing by the enrollment in the or-
ganizations as of a certain time?
As you know, this was a matter of great
difficulty and perhaps why an employee-
negotiating bill failed in the legislature
last year for teachers.
Are you in the constitution setting up
the conditions under which employment ne-
gotiations, collective negotiations in the
public sector can be set up?
DELEGATE MAURER: Not at all. This
is certainly no subject for the constitution.
The constitution should state the principle.
It would be hoped, I think, and very de-
sirable, that the legislature set up ma-
chinery by which this provision could be
implemented.
Certainly, it does not belong in the
constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Maurer?
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