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The situation just does not seem to work
in Maryland under the present law, and
this provision that the man is entitled to
bail or other terms as are reasonably
necessary, seems to me would mandate to
the Legislature a classification of offenses
that could be handled as motor vehicle
offenses are now handled. Then, in non-
support cases, a typical example, where
you had instances, when I was state's at-
torney, of a person arrested for non-sup-
port, the person was taken off his job and
he lost his job sometimes as a result of it.
In these cases there could be a classifica-
tion of offenses in Maryland under which
a man would automatically be entitled to
release, that is, in minor offenses, as he
is now in motor vehicle cases.
It is a strange situation. I was in fed-
eral court in Baltimore with a man charged
with failing to file income tax, a con-
siderable amount of money, and the judge
required no bail at all, let him go on back
home with me and stay three or four
months until the case came up for trial.
And yet in Salisbury I had a case not so
long ago when a man was seated at the
dinner table with his wife and family and
the police came around and took him to
jail and locked him up because his dog was
loose.
This is an actual fact. I went down and
got the man out from behind bars, where
he had been taken and put because his dog
was loose, in violation of the municipal
ordinance. The language in the present
Constitution just does not seem to have
filtered down to the people who have the
keys to the jail.
THE CHAIRMAN: You have one-
quarter minute, Delegate Fox.
DELEGATE FOX: It seems to me there-
fore, that the provision that they are en-
titled to release terms, or to other terms
that may be reasonable and proper, may
be necessary in order to bring our inten-
tions down to the keeper who has the key.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Child.
DELEGATE CHILD: How much time
do we have, sir?
THE CHAIRMAN: Five minutes, Dele-
gate Child.
DELEGATE CHILD: I allot three min-
utes to Delegate Weidemeyer.
DELEGATE WEIDEMEYER: Mr.
President, members of the Committee, I go
along with the Minority Report. I think
what can be said for this report has al-
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ready been said. First that we have ade-
quate provision in section 8, and every-
thing that can be done under that has
been our law.
If we were going to provide in all cases,
except capital or other instances of crime,
that they shall be entitled to release, I
think it deprives the court of that discre-
tion which it needs in all of those cases.
Under our statute, and also under rules
of the court, if the judge finds that a per-
son is worthy of being released on his own
recognizance, he can do it or if he finds
that the person ought to be released but
heavy bail should be set, he can do it. I do
not think that we should put this burden-
some and restrictive statutory language in
our constitution, where, what we have
under section 8, has been there so long and
served us so well.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bothe.
DELEGATE BOTHE: I yield two min-
utes to Delegate Willoner.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Willoner.
DELEGATE WILLONER: Mr. Chair-
man, members of the Committee, we have
gotten this morning a great deal of mis-
information about this particular section.
It is abundantly clear and has been stated
many times that the intent of the section
is nothing more than to bring the present
State of Maryland law up to a constitu-
tional provision.
It does not do the things that Judge
Sherbow would let you believe it does.
Under the present rules of the court, Rule
77A, and I will read it to you, "prior to
conviction the accused who is charged with
an offense, the maximum punishment for
which is other than capital, shall be en-
titled to be admitted to bail."
It is based on a presumption of inno-
cence. There is nothing, however, to pre-
vent the judge from incarcerating a man
because he is dangerous and in a mental
institution. It is a completely different pro-
ceeding for that. He can be sent for minor
offenses to Spring Grove, where he can
have an examination. This is nothing more
really than bringing the present state of
the law to a constitutional provision.
Secondly, excessive bail does not mean
what it has been argued that it means. It
means virtually nothing. There is no right
to bail. If bail is granted, it cannot be
excessive bail.
It is true we have developed greatly
through the courts, through the court
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