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THE CHAIRMAN: Very well, Delegate
Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Mr. Chairman,
Delegate Storm, we have had some wit-
nesses testify at hearings with respect to
sex or equal rights for women. We could
not tell whether they were interested in
putting sex in the constitution or taking it
out or just in favor of sex. In any event,
nobody will deny interest in this subject.
I will wait until you finish talking to the
other sex. I am not sure whom we really
want to protect in this field, sir. We have
had a few importunities from women's or-
ganizations, but we had none from any
men's organizations.
As I say, I am not quite sure who is
ahead in the battle of the sexes. Neverthe-
less, I would say to you that this may be
in the same category as race and color and
with which I have no real great fight.
If we put sex in, are we going to provide
there shall be no discrimination by state
action. That would be all right with me too.
Someone asked me somewhere along the
line, when there is going to be equality of
sex. All I could tell him was that a man
gets on the witness stand, crosses his legs,
and asks for alimony, we might be getting
close to it.
It is very hard, you know, to be against
motherhood, but I suppose that if we are
going to really be serious about it and put
sex in here you can add a lot of other
things that come along with it, too. Women
are still people, and no persons are to be
deprived of equal protection under the laws.
Nevertheless, I must say on the face of
it, that when these women we talked to,
and we have really talked to many, learned
what might happen if we eliminated all of
the protections that they now have and
which they might not otherwise have, they
were not so enthusiastic. Sometimes, they
find themselves like the bulldog chasing an
automobile — what would happen if he
caught it?
I urge you to vote against this.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Kiefer, the
Chair would like to ask a few questions at
this point for clarification, because I do
not believe this matter is covered in your
memoranda. It may be and I may have
overlooked it. If so, you may call attention
to it.
If the amendment is adopted, and the
language of this section then reads that no
person should be subject to discrimination
by the State because of sex, would this
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make invalid the so-called factory laws of
the State providing different work hours
for women than for men?
DELEGATE KIEFER: I do not know,
sir. I do know that there is a very recent
statute which many of you may not be
aware of which does prohibit discrimina-
tion based on wage and salary discrimina-
tions, based on sex, and this provides for
equal work for equal pay in any lawful
business, industry, trade, or profession. But
there are many areas, Mr. Chairman, where
there is some doubt as to what would be
the status of the law if a provision were
put in this Constitution removing all dis-
crimination because it is based on sex. Very
frankly, this is one of the reasons why the
Committee in studying this turned down
this proposition after a considerable debate.
As a matter of fact, a number of ques-
tions with respect to alimony and other
matters were raised at that time and were
subject to such uncertainty that we felt we
ought not include it.
THE CHAIRMAN: I am not clear, does
the Committee indicate that there is doubt
as to such matters, or indicate that there
are any decisions. When I say such mat-
ters, I mean not merely the so-called fac-
tory laws but the different requirements
of age of consent for marriage, testamen-
tary capacity, age of contract, and numer-
ous other distinctions.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Yes, sir. We
looked into some of these and we felt there
would be a considerable confusion if the
word sex were added.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mitchell.
DELEGATE MITCHELL: Mr. Presi-
dent, I would like to say that the Supreme
Court has held that women, or even par-
ticular classes of women, may be singled
out for special treatment in the exercise
of the state's protective power, without vio-
lation of the 14th Amendment classification,
based on differences in their physical char-
acteristics or in the social conditions which
surround their employment.
Now, in the case of West Coast Hotel
Company v. Parrish, decided in 1937, in
300 U. S. 379, reversing earlier decisions,
the Supreme Court upheld a minimum wage
law for women in 1937 stating that their
unequal bargaining position justified a law
only applicable to them.
Again in 1948, the Supreme Court, in
Goesaert v. Cleary, 3.15 U. S. 404, held that
to forbid women to engage in an occupation
where the employment may create special
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