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sumption of validity when an act of the
legislature is passed, thus making it diffi-
cult to strike down legislation under the
equal protection of the laws clause.
Fortunately, the federal courts lead by
the Supreme Court have repudiated the
presumption of validity when classification
entered into the field of race, religion, or
national origin.
The state courts, on the other hand, have
lagged behind in this area. I suggest that
the inclusion of the specific language would
make it perfectly clear to the courts of
this state, that the presumption of the
legislative validity in this field does not
apply with the same force that it applies
in the economic area.
THE CHAIRMAN: You have one-half
minute, Delegate Scanlan.
DELEGATE SCANLAN: One of the
great objectives of this Convention is to
erect a charter of state government that
would allow us to take the lead in certain
areas, rather than always being required
to fall back upon the federal government
to vindicate liberties and achieve progress.
I suggest the amendment sponsored by
the minority is an instance of where this
State could set an example to the other
states and to the federal government, and
for once furnish an example of the State
taking the lead in an area of human liber-
ties, rather than always following.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hardwicke.
DELEGATE HARDWICKE: Mr. Chair-
man, I yield the balance of the majority's
time to Delegate Hostetter.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hostetter,
you have five minutes.
DELEGATE HOSTETTER: Mr. Chair-
man, ladies and gentlemen of the Commit-
tee of the Whole: I think we have heard
enough about state action and I certainly
agree with Delegate Hardwicke when he
says that we did labor long and hard to
try to make this a colorblind constitution,
and I think that probably Delegate Hard-
wicke and Delegate Mitchell probably
worked the hardest on this.
Delegate Scanlan has indicated that the
additional wording will add a great deal,
but it has been my understanding since we
have adopted the identical language of the
federal Constitution, Amendment 14, that
this also entitles us to the body of case
law which comes with that, so that we
would be right in line with the Supreme
Court.
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Now, as I say, enough has been said
about state action. However, it is almost
an indefinable term. On one occasion, the
Supreme Court will g%o into the private
sector, as it did in Shelley v. Kraemer, and
will give a ruling in that area, simply be-
cause state judication was sought to uphold
the covenants of a realty agreement.
On the other hand, in two other cases,
Drews v. State of Maryland and Watkins
v. Oakland Jockey Club, an action on the
part of the State was involved, and the
Supreme Court went in the opposite direc-
tion and said that the action of the State
in these cases had not endorsed discrimina-
tion.
I would like to quote at this point from
an article in the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
with respect to these two last cases that I
have been talking about.
"Drews and Watkins emphasize private
property interests and the right to enforce
these interests."
"Cases such as Drews and Watkins are
reasonable decisions and in the sphere of
judicial enforcement, private property
rights and private decisions will be mean-
ingless unless they are enforceable."
Unless we have access to the courts and
to the executive, and to the police au-
thority, our private property rights in some
areas may be meaningless to us.
At this point, I would like to quote
briefly from the Sixth Committee Report
of the Constitutional Convention Commis-
sion. It states here "The Committee seri-
ously considered expanding the equal pro-
tection clause to include a statement such
as that found in Section 20 of the new
Connecticut Constitution of 1965." (This
section is quoted in the minority report.)
"The Committee's principal reason for
opposing such a provision is that it would
introduce into the Declaration of Rights
terms which are indefinite in meaning and
indeterminate in scope from a legal stand-
point.
"The Committee respectfully suggests
that the quoted provision amounts to a
comprehensive mandate directed to private
actions and relationships as well as to acts
of the government vis-a-vis individual citi-
zens. As such, the Committee believes it
sweeps far beyond the principle of equal
protection in the 14th Amendment, has no
identifiable limits, and carries a potential
impact which is impossible for any member
of the Commission or Convention to foresee
or evaluate."
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