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government within the State.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mitchell.
DELEGATE MITCHELL: I think the
courts have interpreted the State to include
all of the political subdivisions, the agen-
cies, the servants, employees. Wherever the
state influence and support goes, that is
where the State is. That is state action.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hostetter.
DELEGATE HOSTETTER: Delegate
Mitchell, then what you are saying is that
the words "discrimination which the state"
mean state action?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mitchell.
DELEGATE MITCHELL: Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hostetter.
DELEGATE HOSTETTER: Now, dis-
crimination by law, would this also mean
state action?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mitchell.
DELEGATE MITCHELL: Yes, law as it
is commonly known, is interpreted by
masses of people to mean legislation. But
law can mean the rules of the State, whether
it is legislative, whether it is the court
precedents, whether it is administrative
and the like. We believe that the word
"state" is a word which has been inter-
preted because of the 14th Amendment lan-
guage and has resulted in a tremendous
body of case law interpreting what state
action is.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hostetter.
DELEGATE HOSTETXER: And discrimi-
nation by the State, getting back to Dele-
gate Sollins' question as to whether or not
it covers all of the instrumentalities of the
State, could also mean the same thing as
other governmental action. Is this not cor-
rect?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mitchell.
DELEGATE MITCHELL: Yes, but in the
area of the phrase "governmental action"
per se, it does not have the body of case
law. The courts have said that this is gov-
ernmental action when it has a case before
it involving denial of the equal protection
of laws by the State, and have used gov-
ernmental action in some instances with the
word "state." But it is our opinion that the
word "state" as it is interpreted now, and
as it will be interpreted by the courts of
this State and the General Assembly and
by the federal courts and the Supreme
Court, will involve action by the State, all
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action, whatever the facts and circum-
stances of the case before it indicate as
far as its influence upon the denial to a
citizen of the equal protection of the law.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hostetter.
DELEGATE HOSTETTER: From this
point on I will use the term "state action".
I believe we understand that, Delegate
Mitchell.
It is my understanding that there have
been cases involving state action which
have gone over into the private sector. I
would like to ask you at this time what
would be meant by the term "private dis-
crimination" ?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mitchell.
DELEGATE MITCHELL: In the case of
Shelley v. Kraemer, which was decided by
the Supreme Court in 1948, and which in-
volved racially restrictive covenants, the
court there interpreted state action to mean
judicial action of the courts, as Justice
Bradley said in 1883 in the Civil Rights
cases. The Supreme Court said that while
this was a private agreement between a
purchaser and a seller, nevertheless if it
was discriminatory on racial grounds, the
complainant could not come into the court.
The court could not be asked to use its
strength, or the whole panoply of the court
action, to enforce a private agreement dis-
criminating against citizens which the 13th,
14th and 15th Amendments to the federal
Constitution were enacted to eliminate.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Hostetter.
DELEGATE HOSTETTER: According to
your amendment, Delegate Mitchell, would
there be any way that the people of the
State of Maryland could be sure that the
private sector would be protected ? In other
words, that this entire area be kept within
the public sector? We have had this dis-
cussion before in Committee. Is there any
real protection there or guarantee in your
proposal here, your amendment, that the
private sector would be protected?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Mitchell.
DELEGATE MITCHELL: I would like to
quote for you the language of the Supreme
Court in this area of private discrimina-
tion, and how far state action goes.
In Belle v. Maryland, we had a private
proprietor of a restaurant who had opened
up his private property to the public, and
was subject to all of the statutory regula-
tions of the city and State, health and
otherwise. He had opened the restaurant to
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