|
DELEGATE KIEFER: I will answer that
in this way, that this case establishes this
concept and the principle the Committee
intended to reach, and that is the effective
separation of church and state.
The answer is therefore in the affirmative.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Macdonald.
DELEGATE MACDONALD: Did the
Committee consider whether or not you
should include a clause which would, in so
many words, prohibit a contribution of tax
funds to a religiously-oriented institution?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: We did, and we
rejected it.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Macdonald.
DELEGATE MACDONALD: Why did
you reject it?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Because we think
the language we have stated clearly states
that very principle, and the language of
the Horace Mann case specifically states
that such a contribution is forbidden.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Macdonald, do you have a further '
question?
DELEGATE MACDONALD: You think
you have already taken care of that situa-
tion, and that any such language as I men-
tioned would be superfluous ?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Exactly.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Gallagher.
DELEGATE GALLAGHER: Chairman
Kiefer, you have adopted substantially the
religious clauses of the First Amendment to
the federal Constitution.
Am I to assume correctly that your Com-
mittee contemplated that the Supreme
Court of the United States would have the
ultimate and final determination in inter-
preting this particular language?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: Well, it has only
to the extent that it sets the limits beyond
|
which the State cannot go. The State can
be more broad in its interpretation, if it
wants.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Gallagher.
DELEGATE GALLAGHER: Well, now,
if the Supreme Court of the United States
should determine that the language of the
First Amendment in the precise area in
which the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled
in Horace Mann was somewhat different
from the ruling in that case, would the
Supreme Court of the United States pre-
vail or would the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals ruling prevail?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: In the State of
Maryland, the Court of Appeals ruling
would be the controlling ruling unless and
until it reversed itself or changed it, obvi-
ously.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Gallagher.
DELEGATE GALLAGHER: You do not
suggest that when the ruling of the United
States Supreme Court and the ruling of the
Maryland Court of Appeals conflict that
the Supreme Court does not prevail?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: No, the Supreme
Court obviously prevails.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Gallagher.
DELEGATE GALLAGHER: Has your
Committee given any consideration to what
effect the case of Truitt v. Tawes, involv-
ing hospital construction loans, had on
changing or otherwise overruling the opin-
ion in the Horace Mann case?
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Kiefer.
DELEGATE KIEFER: I do not think
that we considered it from that particular
point of view. We know about that case.
That involves hospital aid, and that was not
a matter of religious aid but a matter of a
public purpose for hospital care, public
welfare, and this is an area in which there
has never been any conflict, as far as I
know.
DELEGATE J. CLARK (presiding):
Delegate Gallagher.
DELEGATE GALLAGHER: If it should
be determined that Truitt v. Tawes, the
|
