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for an agency ought to be also one of the
policy makers of the agency.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bennett.
DELEGATE BENNETT: What we want
to do, do we not, is to get a man of high
caliber and a person of broad experience
and a person looking forward to a broad
scope of duties in this office and I am
afraid that this would restrict it and that
we will not get the kind of man that we
need for the attorney general, if we limit it
to being a desk lawyer.
DELEGATE BAMBERGER: I do not
think he is a desk lawyer at all. He is a
lawyer for the corporation but he is not
one of the directors of the corporation and
those are different functions.
THE CHAIRMAN : Are there any other
questions of the sponsors?
Delegate Henderson?
DELEGATE HENDERSON: Just one
question. I take it from what you have said
that this would not prevent the governor
from appointing the attorney general as
the head of a commission such as I had
the honor of serving on to investigate the
Police Department of Baltimore City. Ac-
tually, the Police Department was one of
his clients but he was the chairman of
the commission instituting that.
Would this prevent that, do you think?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bamberger.
DELEGATE BAMBERGER: I do not
think it would prevent it because it is a
commission which acts in a fact-finding
way, an investigatory way and an advisory
way and I must say I am delighted to have
an opportunity on the same day to agree
with Judge Henderson.
THE CHAIRMAN: Are there any other
questions?
Delegate Case?
DELEGATE CASE: Delegate Bamberg-
er, does this permit the General Assembly
statutorily to define the responsibilities of
the chief legal officer?
For example, suppose the statute started
out, "It is hereby declared to be the re-
sponsibility of the chief legal officer of the
State to administer the blue sky laws." Do
you see the point I am driving at?
THE CHAIRMAN : Delegate Bamberger.
DELEGATE BAMBERGER: No, it is
certainly not the intention to permit the
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General Assembly to enlarge its power to
prescribe duties by defining the limits of
those duties and it seems to me that that
is covered by the first sentence which says,
"He shall be the chief legal officer of the
State."
The Committee's report makes it clear
what they mean by that and I find nothing
in the language to suggest that they can
redefine that or even define it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Case.
DELEGATE CASE: The constitutional
provision before us nowhere defines re-
sponsibilities as I understand it and I am
suggesting to you that the legislative decla-
ration that such and such are his responsi-
bilities, would that not be binding on the
courts who would say nay?
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bamberger.
DELEGATE BAMBERGER: I do not
see how the General Assembly could say
that a function which is not a function of
a lawyer for the State, is part of the
responsibility of the chief legal officer.
What we have said is that he is the lawyer
for the State and they may not change him
into something else.
I do not know any way to clear this up,
except to make it perfectly clear that the
intent of the amendment is to prescribe the
role of the General Assembly as one in
which they may only give the attorney gen-
eral jobs which are lawyer jobs and may
not make him be something other than a
lawyer.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Case?
DELEGATE CASE: So that if the Gen-
eral Assembly in implementing the con-
sumer protection provision which we have
already adopted should say in its enabling
act, "It shall be and it is hereby defined to
be the responsibilities and duties of the
attorney general to administer the follow-
ing laws which are enacted to protect the
consumer," you would think that that would
be an unconstitutional delegation of power
to the attorney general.
THE CHAIRMAN: Delegate Bamberger.
DELEGATE BAMBERGER: Yes, because
of your use of the word "administer." All
they could say is that it is his function to
advise that department, it is his function to
enforce those laws, but not to administer.
THE CHAIRMAN: Your time has ex-
pired to answer questions.
The Chair recognizes Delegate Morgan.
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